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CAPITAL SENTENCING AFTER WALTON
v. ARIZONA: A RETREAT FROM THE
"DEATH IS DIFFERENT" DOCTRINE
DANIEL Ross HARRIS
The Court . . . has recognized that the qualitative difference of
death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly
greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing
determination.'
INTRODUCTION
The underlying assumption of modem eighth amendment 2 juris-
prudence can be summarized simply: death is different.3 The
United States Supreme Court first gave precedential weight to this
distinction between death and other punishment in its landmark rul-
1. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983).
2. The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. See generally B. NAxELL & K. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 29-37
(1987). The unique status of the death sentence was recognized long before the landmark
decision in Furman v. Georgia. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 285-91 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (summarizing prior doctrinal distinctions between death and lesser punish-
ments and stating that because of unusual severity, enormity, and finality, death is in class by
itself). For years, the Supreme Court distinguished capital cases from others when addressing
the constitutional right to counsel. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (hold-
ing that in prosecution for rape, failure to provide adequate assistance of counsel violates due
process guarantee); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (holding that right to counsel
may attach to charge that carries possible capital punishment, but no right attaches to criminal
charges of differing magnitude); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 674-75 (1948) (stating that
convicting petitioner of non-capital offense without assistance of counsel does not violate due
process of law). The general concern with capital cases centers on the finality of the punish-
ment and the need for closer scrutiny than is necessary for a reversible punishment. See An-
dres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948) (concluding that when doubts arise due to
ambiguous jury instruction by lower court, such doubts should be resolved in favor of
accused).
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ing, Furman v. Georgia.4 Furman declared all existing death penalty
statutes unconstitutional as a violation of the eighth amendment bar
against cruel and unusual punishment.5 In a series of subsequent
cases, the Court developed and refined its eighth amendment re-
quirements under which states could adopt valid capital sentencing
statutes.
6
The premise that death is qualitatively different from all other
punishments represents the foundation upon which the Court fash-
ioned two requirements to regulate the constitutionally valid appli-
cation of capital punishment.7 The first requirement, introduced by
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Court's decision in Furman and its distinction of death from all other punishment).
5. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 428-29 (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding existing
death penalty procedures violative of eighth amendment because of arbitrary and inconsistent
application); see also Comment, Dark Year on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion After Zant, 17
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 689, 689-90 (1984) [hereinafter Dark Years on Death Row] (noting effects of
Furman on state capital punishment statutes and subsequent attempts to enact language to
conform with Court's ruling).
6. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-16 (1982) (invalidating death sen-
tence imposed after judge refused to consider certain mitigating evidence); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 602-07 (1978) (plurality opinion) (stating that statute limiting juror considera-
tion of mitigating evidence in capital cases violates eighth amendment); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 154 (1976) (upholding statute requiring jury consideration of specified aggravating
factors and permitting jury consideration of any mitigating circumstances before imposing
death); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293, 304-05 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, Ste-
vens, JJ., concurring) (invalidating statute mandating capital sentence if defendant is con-
victed of certain enumerated crimes).
7. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (Stevens, Stewart, Powell, JJ.,
concurring) (stating that fiye members of Court expressly recognized "death is different" doc-
trine in early eighth amendment cases that provided dual requirements for constitutionally
valid capital sentencing procedures).
As eighth amendment jurisprudence evolved in cases where capital sentencing was at issue,
individual members of the Supreme Court began to adopt the concept that death should be
treated differently from all other punishments. For example, Justices Brennan, Douglas, and
Marshall each distinguished the death penalty from other punishment before Furman. See
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809-10 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (distinguish-
ing plea bargain when death is potential penalty). Justice Brennan noted that when the possi-
bility of capital punishment exists, the defendant is no longer on equal footing with the state.
Id. As a result, the defendant either pleads guilty to a lesser crime or runs the risk of a guilty
verdict and the imposition of the death penalty. Id.
Justice Stewart adopted the distinction for the first time in his Furman opinion which
originated the first constitutional requirement of guided sentencing:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection
of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is
unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of
humanity.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, in two 1976 opinions, re-
peated that the death penalty was entirely different from any other punishment. See Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., concurring) (noting that
"death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability"); Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., concurring) (finding "that death
is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree").
Justice Powell, who dissented from Furman and directly disavowed the "death is different"
construct, relied on the doctrine in two 1976 cases to formulate the second constitutional
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Furman, stated that a valid capital sentence may not result from un-
guided discretion.8 The second requirement, developed after
Furman, mandated consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence
to ensure an individualized sentencing determination. 9
These two limitations on capital sentencing procedure co-existed
in one viable body of law based on the presumption that the penalty
of death is unique among other state-imposed punishments. 10 The
requirement of individualized sentencing. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (joining opinion ofJus-
tice Stewart who argued for adoption of "death is different" doctrine); Woodson, 428 U.S. at
303-04 (citingJustice Stewart's andJustice Brennan's concurring opinions in Furman wherein
both Justices distinguished death from other penalties). Justice Stevens, as a new member of
the Court, also endorsed the doctrine in those 1976 cases. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187; Woodson,
428 U.S. at 302-04.
Justice White, who originally refused to adopt the principle that death is different, later
adopted it. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 34-37 (1986) (recognizing qualitative differ-
ence of death from other punishment and citing other Justices for support).
Justice Blackmun first endorsed the distinction when he joined Justice Stevens' opinion in
Beck v. Alabama. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (noting that "significant con-
stitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments" is that death re-
quires imposition based on reason not emotion).
Justice O'Connor, shortly after joining the Court, also adopted the "death is different"
doctrine:
Because sentences of death are 'qualitatively different' from prison sentences, ...
this Court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner sentenced
to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possi-
ble, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 254-57 (plurality opinion) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing
that such discretion spares socially protected and imposes death on poor and despised); id. at
274-97 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that human dignity is offended when state arbitrar-
ily inflicts more severe punishment on some than on others).
9. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (concluding that state
must allow capital sentencer to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, defined as any aspect
of defendant's character, record, or aspects concerning offense). The post-Lockett doctrine,
therefore, placed particular guidance requirements as to the consideration of aggravating fac-
tors presented by the prosecution, while affording great discretion to a capital sentencer in
considering mitigating circumstances. See id. (stating that eighth and fourteenth amendments
require sentencer to consider all relevant evidence of defendant's record or character and any
circumstances of offense that would promote basis for sentence less than death).
In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Court ratified the Lockett plurality decision by requiring a capital
sentencer to consider all relevant mitigating evidence. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at
115, 115 n.10 (1982) (stating that Oklahoma statute at issue allows defendant to present evi-
dence as to any mitigating factor, and Lockett requires sentencer to listen).
10. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110-15 (tracing history of developing death penalty jurispru-
dence in Supreme Court and holding that rule in Lockett followed from Court's early deci-
sions). The doctrine that emerged after Lockett required the state to adopt a fair and
consistent procedure for inflicting death, which responded to the Furman prohibition against
arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing statutes and the requirement that the state con-
sider any relevant mitigating factor. Id. at 112; see also Dark Year on Death Row, supra note 5, at
699 (discussing "Furman-Lockett" paradox and arguing two cases are reconcilable).
The arguable paradox of these two decisions resulted from the Furman requirement that the
sentencing process remain free from arbitrary and capricious judgments. Id. This led to the
enactment of sentencing guideline statutes and the requirement that specific aggravating fac-
tors be established before death could be authorized. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.6(3)-(4)
(1980) (exemplifying statute enacted by several states in attempt to comply with Supreme
Court's capital sentencing requirements); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 154 (1976)
(upholding sentencing statute that required state to prove specified aggravating factors and to
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unique status of death as a punishment mandated the provision of
additional safeguards to ensure that the application of capital pun-
ishment was neither cruel nor unusual." In Walton v. Arizona, 12 the
Supreme Court departed from this principle after two decades of
consistent application.'
The Arizona statute involved in Walton included two provisions
directly opposed to the "death is different" doctrine.' 4 The first
provision precluded sentencer consideration of any mitigating evi-
dence not established by a preponderance of the evidence.15 The
second provision mandated a sentence of death unless the defend-
ant could show mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh all
aggravating factors established by the state.' 6 In effect, the defend-
ant in Walton was forced to show why the death penalty was inappro-
priate.' 7 Mr. Walton failed to meet the requisite burden and, as a
permit consideration of any mitigating circumstance provided by defendant). The plurality
later held in Lockett that any relevant mitigating factor could be considered. Lockett, 438 U.S.
at 604. This gave the sentencer wide discretion in a capital sentencing case which conflicted
with the reasoning in Furman. The paradox, however, is easily reconciled: the reasoning of
Furman only requires the state to enact a sentencing statute free from the arbitrary and capri-
cious application of death. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110-11. But see infra notes 136-49 and accom-
panying text (discussing Justice Scalia's belief that doctrine is not reconcilable). The Furman
reasoning does not address the arbitrary application of mercy, which is constitutionally per-
missible. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (permitting sentencer to consider any mitigating factor
that would present basis for sentence less than death). Therefore, the resulting postLockett
death penalty jurisprudence still mandated that a sentencer could not arbitrarily impose
death, but must first establish the existence of certain aggravating factors. The sentencer,
however, has wide discretion to impose mercy. Dark Year on Death Row, supra note 5, at 689.
11. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.,
concurring) (recognizing importance of additional safeguards in capital sentencing procedure
to protect against imposition of excessive, disproportionate, or arbitrary penalty).
12. 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
13. See Walton v. Arizona, I10 S. Ct. 3047, 3055 (1990) (plurality opinion) (upholding
Arizona Supreme Court's statutory interpretation and its application in Walton's case).
14. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1989) (providing state procedure for sentence of
death).
15. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (1989) (proclaiming that "[t]he burden of es-
tablishing the existence of the circumstances in subsection G of this section [in mitigation] is
on the defendant."); see also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(l)-(5) (1989) (defining miti-
gating circumstances as any factors proffered by defendant or state that are relevant in deter-
mining whether to impose death and listing several general mitigating factors). The Arizona
Supreme Court has interpreted section 13-703(C) as precluding sentencer consideration of
any mitigating factor not established by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. McMur-
trey, 143 Ariz. 71, 72-73, 691 P.2d 1099, 1100-1101 (1984) (holding state must prove aggra-
vating factors beyond reasonable doubt and defendant must prove mitigating circumstances
by preponderance of evidence before such factors are considered by sentencers), aff'd, 726
P.2d 202 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911 (1987).
16. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (1989) (requiring that judge impose capital
sentence if one or more aggravating factors are established by state and no mitigating evi-
dence established by defendant sufficiently substantial to call for leniency).
17. See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055-56 (upholding statute's requirement that defendant
establish mitigating factor by preponderance of evidence before sentencer may consider it).
The eighth amendment, before Walton, required an affirmative showing that aggravating fac-
tors outweighed the mitigating factors before a constitutionally valid death sentence could
stand. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion) (requiring state to
Walton v. Arizona
result, was sentenced to death.18
A plurality of the United States Supreme Court upheld the Ari-
zona statute and affirmed Walton's capital sentence without a
lengthy discussion.19 The plurality justified its departure from set-
tled precedent by equating the defendant's burden at the capital
sentencing hearing to that of a criminal defendant asserting an af-
firmative defense of insanity.20 By affirming Arizona's capital sen-
tencing scheme on such slight precedent, the Court implicitly
rejected the long-accepted notion that a sentence of death is unlike
any other punishment.
This Note evaluates Walton v. Arizona in light of the United States
Supreme Court's prior commitment to the "death is different" doc-
trine. Part I traces the evolution of capital sentencing jurisprudence
from the landmark 1972 decision in Furman.21 In particular, Part I
focuses on the emergence of the "death is different" doctrine as the
foundation for the Court's regulation of capital sentencing proce-
dures. Part II sets out the factual background of Walton and outlines
the Supreme Court's decision. 22 Part III analyzes Justice White's
plurality opinion by examining it in the framework of the "death is
different" doctrine and the relevant case law.23 Part III also criti-
cizes Justice Scalia's concurrence in which he states that the require-
ment of individualized sentencing cannot co-exist with the dictates
of Furman and is, therefore, no longer applicable. 24 Part IV investi-
gates the potential ramifications of Walton v. Arizona in the lower
courts and on legislative attempts to expedite the capital sentencing
permit use of any mitigating factor defendant proffers as basis for sentence less than death);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 154 (1976) (affirming sentencing scheme that required state
to establish aggravating circumstances, but allowed sentencer to consider any mitigating cir-
cumstance). Walton, however, upheld a statutory construction that mandated a sentence of
death if aggravating and mitigating factors are of equal weight. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3075
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
18. See State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 590-91, 769 P.2d 1017, 1034-35 (1989) (uphold-
ing trial judge's ruling that defendant did not establish mitigating evidence sufficiently sub-
stantial to call for leniency); see also Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3052-53 (1990)
(plurality opinion) (describing facts surrounding Walton's trial, post-conviction hearing, and
subsequent sentence of death).
19. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055-57.
20. See id. at 3055 (citing affirmative defense cases to justify imposition of preponderance
burden on defendant at post-conviction capital sentencing hearing).
21. See infra notes 26-87 and accompanying text (tracing recent history of capital sen-
tencing jurisprudence).
22. See infra notes 88-161 and accompanying text (discussing opinion of Supreme Court
in Walton).
23. See infra notes 162-212 and accompanying text (analyzing Supreme Court decision).
24. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's
concurrence).
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process. 25 This Note concludes that a plurality of the Supreme
Court has begun to erode the fundamental distinction between the
death penalty and all other punishments. This reversal of a firmly-
established principle opens the door to fundamental changes in the
constitutional protections designed to avoid unfair, biased, and ca-
pricious application of capital punishment.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Prohibition on Arbitrary Sentencing
Prior to 1972, capital sentencers in the United States enjoyed un-
fettered discretion to decide the fate of criminal defendants.26 A
judge or jury based its capital sentencing decision primarily on con-
clusions developed from evidence presented during the trial.27 This
process of discretionary sentencing resulted in an extremely incon-
sistent application of the death penalty influenced, to a large de-
gree, by racial discrimination. 2
8
In Furman v. Georgia,29 the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the application of capital sentencing, in the absence of judicial
guidance, represented an unconstitutional infringement of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. ° The effect of the five-to-four
decision was to vacate the sentences of over 600 death row inmates
25. See infra notes 213-37 and accompanying text (discussing ramifications of Walton v.
Arizona).
26. See Paternoster & Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death Penalty in South Carolina: Ex-
periences Over the First Few Years, 39 S.C.L. REv. 245, 260-62 (1988) (remarking on absolute
discretion afforded pre-Furman capital sentencers and resulting injustice attributable to racial
and emotional bias); Annotation, Supreme Court's Views on Constitutionality of Death Penalty and
Procedures Under Which It Is Imposed or Carried Out, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1001, 1023-25 § 8[a] (1988)
[hereinafter Annotation, Constitutionality of Death Penalty] (summarizing impact of Furman deci-
sion and addressing flaws of capital sentencing statutes that result in constitutional invalidity).
27. See W. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MOD-
ERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 5 (1987) (discussing decisionmaking process by pre-
Furman capital sentencers); Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of
Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409, 413 (1990) (summarizing
pre-Furman capital sentencing procedures which led to discrimination against non-white
defendants).
28. See Gross, Race & Death: The Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of Discrimination in Capital
Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1275, 1282-84 (summarizing pre-Furman instances of dis-
crimination in death penalty application). For instance, when the punishment for the crime of
rape was death, 85%o of those executed in the South for rape were African-American, and
black men were 18 times more likely to be convicted of raping white women than white men.
Id.; see also W. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 57-
58 (1984) (discussing disproportionate number of African-Americans executed for rape in
South); B. NAKELL & K. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 82 (1987) (citing
empirical conclusions of racial discrimination in imposition of death sentence); Wolfgang &
Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 119, 126-33 (1973) (present-
ing statistical evidence of sentencing discrimination against African-American defendants
convicted of raping white victims).
29. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
30. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
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and to invalidate all forty death penalty statutes then in existence.31
The plurality's reasoning in Furman focused on the Georgia death
penalty statute's lack of guidance for capital sentencing juries.
32
Under the Georgia law, a jury had complete discretion to determine
whether a convicted criminal should serve a prison sentence or
die.3 3 Recognizing the unique nature of the death penalty, the plu-
rality held that any procedure permitting potential arbitrary or ca-
pricious application constituted a violation of the eighth
amendment.3 4 Furman thus established the principle that death is
31. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting) (remarking on widespread effect
of concurring opinions by five separate Justices on existing death penalty statutes). Justices
White, Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall constituted the plurality while Justices Pow-
ell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and ChiefJustice Burger dissented. Id. at 240.
32. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 257-58 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing authority finding ar-
bitrary capital sentencing procedure unconstitutional); id. at 274-75 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(citing unguided discretion as cruel and unusual); id. at 309-10 (Stewart,J., concurring) (argu-
ing that arbitrary sentencing leads to unconstitutional procedure); id at 311-12 (White, J.,
concurring) (commenting that arbitrary and infrequent use of death penalty is cruel and unu-
sual); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 598 (1986) (finding constitutional state of discre-
tionary sentencing was changed abruptly by Furman opinions).
33. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
6-1(b)) (delineating potential sentencing options without any guidance). The Georgia statute
afforded ajury three sentencing options: (1) imprisonment for more than one year but less
than twenty years; (2) imprisonment for life; or (3) death. Id.; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 308
n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting options available to Georgia sentencers).
34. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (plurality opinion) (White, J., concurring) (finding that
death penalty is handed down infrequently and that there is no meaningful basis on which to
distinguish who receives death sentence); see also Zimring & Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the
Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in Retrospect, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 927, 929-44 (1985)
(evaluating and critiquing opinions in Furman).
Although the justices agreed that the death penalty is different from other sentences, each
espoused a different theory about when a death penalty statute violated the eighth amend-
ment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. See Zimring & Hawkins, Capital Pun-
ishment and the Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in Retrospect, supra, at 929-44 (analyzing
reasoning of five concurring opinions in Furman). Justice Douglas, for example, found the
capital sentence to be "unusual" and, therefore, unconstitutional under the eighth amend-
ment, but only if the selection process permitted discrimination based on the defendant's
religion, race, wealth, social status, or class. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57 (plurality opinion)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (finding existing death penalty statutes "pregnant with discrimina-
tion" and, therefore, repugnant to eighth and fourteenth amendments). Justice Stewart also
found Georgia's statute cruel and unusual because of its arbitrary and unpredictable applica-
tion. See id at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) (likening random application of death penalty to
possibility of being struck by lightning). Justice White believed the statute failed as a deter-
rent and mandated the pointless and needless extinction of life. See id. at 312 (White, J.,
concurring) (arguing that because death penalty is so infrequently and arbitrarily adminis-
tered it does not serve deterrent purpose).
Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded in separate opinions that the death penalty, by
definition, is at odds with the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment
and is per se unconstitutional. Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring), 360 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman stated his reasons for finding the death pen-
alty unconstitutional in any form. See id. at 269 (Brennan,J., concurring) (arguing that Court
has fundamental duty to enforce Bill of Rights by checking actions of legislature when pre-
scribing punishment and that failure to do so would reduce cruel and unusual clause to "little
more than good advice"). The Court had previously employed "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" to determine which punishments
should be constitutionally proscribed under the eighth amendment. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
1396 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REvIEW[Vol. 40:1389
qualitatively different from other penalties.
B. The Development of Guidance Standards
Although Furman invalidated all existing capital sentencing stat-
utes, the Court did not hold the penalty of death per se unconstitu-
tional.35 The Furman plurality also failed to indicate how much
judicial guidance was necessary for a death penalty statute to satisfy
the eighth amendment.3 6 Because the Furman decision did not pro-
vide specific requirements, state legislatures seeking to reinstate the
death penalty opted for one of two different statutory
constructions.
3 7
Twenty-eight states responded quickly to the Furman decision
with new death penalty statutes incorporating varying degrees of
sentencing guidance to remove the capricious and arbitrary ele-
ments from the process of sentencing.38 One contingent of states
enacted legislation making the sentence of death mandatory for par-
ticular capital crimes such as felony murder, contract murder, mur-
86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion) (arguing that words of eighth amendment are not pre-
cise and their "scope is not static"). In Furman,Justice Brennan extended Trop and concluded
that the eighth amendment bans the imposition of any punishment "degrading to the dignity
of human beings." Furman, 238 U.S. at 271 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justices Brennan and Marshall have cited their belief that the death penalty is per se uncon-
stitutional in over 1,700 subsequent capital sentencing cases and application for stays of exe-
cution. See, e.g., Bertolotti v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 2, 2 (1990) (MarshalI,J., dissenting) (arguing
for stay of execution because death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in all cases);
Boggs v. Muncy, 111 S. Ct. 2, 2 (1990) (Brennan & MarshallJJ., dissenting) (adhering to view
that death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment); Collins v. Arkansas, 429 U.S. 808, 808
(1976) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that for reasons set out in Gregg death
penalty is cruel and unusual).
35. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 310-11 (Douglas, J., concurring) (declining to address ulti-
mate question of whether death sentence is constitutional in any form). Justice White con-
curred only in the capital sentencing cases immediately before the Court rather than ruling on
the death penalty's general eighth amendment status. Id. at 311 (WhiteJ., concurring). Simi-
larly, Justice Stewart found that the death penalty offended the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments only when "wantonly and freakishly" applied. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
36. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599 (1978) (plurality opinion) (concluding that
"the variety of opinions supporting the judgment in Furman engendered confusion as to what
was required in order to impose the death penalty in accord with the Eighth Amendment"); see
also Note, Mills v. Maryland: The Supreme Court Guarantees the Consideration of Mitigating Circum-
stances Pursuant to Lockett v. Ohio, 38 CATm. U.L. REv. 907, 917 (1989) (remarking on state
statutory response to ambiguity created by Furman); Survey, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term:
Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 139, 139 (1990) (describing as ambiguous range of statutes
deemed to be constitutional under Furman).
37. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.,
concurring) (noting varying legislative responses to Furman in attempt to create less arbitrary
capital sentencing process). Three years after the Supreme Court invalidated all death pen-
alty statutes in Furman, 35 states and the federal government had enacted new capital punish-
ment laws. Id. at 179 n.23.
38. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1690, 1699-1712 (1974) (summarizing death penalty statutes adopted immediately after
Furman and evaluating various approaches to sentencing discretion).
1991] Walton v. Arizona 1397
der while serving a life sentence, and murder of a peace officer.39
Other states that enacted capital sentencing statutes chose schemes
mandating a balancing test using specific mitigating and aggravating
factors. 40 These statutory constructions were heavily influenced by
the Model Penal Code which curtailed sentencer discretion by fo-
cusing a sentencer's consideration on particular factors. 4'
By 1976, four years after Furman invalidated all death penalty stat-
utes, more than 460 inmates were on death row after being sen-
tenced under one of the two new capital sentencing schemes.42 In
the 1975 October term, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to five cases challenging recently-enacted death penalty
statutes. 43 The plurality opinions written by Justices Stewart, Pow-
39. Id. at 1710-12. States enacting statutes with mandatory sentencing provisions in-
cluded Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Wyoming, California, and
Montana. Id. at 1710 n.140.
40. ld at 1704 n.92. The states enacting aggravating/mitigating test included Arizona,
Florida, Nebraska, and Tennessee. Id.
41. See id. at 1699-1700 (outlining variations of mitigating/aggravating factor balancing
statutes). Some of the aggravating factors included: (1) the defendant engaged in the mur-
der of another person at the time this murder was committed; (2) the defendant knowingly
created a risk of death to many persons; and (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary
gain. These factors are then weighed against mitigating factors, such as: (1) the defendant
had no prior criminal record; (2) the murder was committed under circumstances that the
defendant believed provided moral justification; and (3) the youth of the defendant at the
time of the crime. Id. The American Law Institute's (ALI) Advisory Committee originally
voted 18-2 to abolish the death penalty entirely. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6, comment 1,
at 111 (1980). Realizing that many states would reject abolition, the ALl concluded that it
should address the specific issues arising from the application of capital sentencing. Id. Thir-
teen years before Furman was decided, the Model Penal Code Committee found unguided
discretion to be the greatest danger in the capital sentencing process. ALl Proceedings 152,
170 (1959). As such, the ALI constructed a list of aggravating and mitigating factors to be
considered in a sentencing procedure. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)-(4) (1980) [herein-
after M.P.C.] (outlining aggravating and mitigating circumstances). While the circumstances
enumerated in section 210.6 were not meant to be exhaustive, the ALI sought to "identify the
main circumstances of aggravation and mitigation that should be weighed and weighed against
each other when they are presented in a concrete case." M.P.C. § 210.6, comment 5, at 135
(emphasis in original). The ALI placed great emphasis on curtailing sentencer discretion
when invoking the death penalty. Id. As a result, the Model Penal Code required the finding
of at least one of the enumerated aggravating factors, but allowed broader discretion in the
mitigating factor analysis. See M.P.C. § 210.6(2) (mandating that sentencer "shall not impose
sentence of death unless it finds one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated ... and
further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency.").
42. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, Stevens,JJ., concur-
ring) (discussing effects of post-Furman death penalty statutes).
43. See id. (upholding statute that required state to prove at least one of ten aggravating
factors beyond reasonable doubt and permitted consideration of mitigating circumstances
before death is imposed); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding statute that
required trial judge to weigh eight aggravating factors against seven statutory mitigating fac-
tors to determine whether death sentence should be imposed); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976) (affirming state statutory scheme that mandated death ifjury answered three questions
affirmatively concerning manner in which defendant committed murder); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (striking down statute that mandated death for first degree
1398 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 40:1389
ell, and Stevens in each of these cases formed the nucleus of mod-
em death penalty jurisprudence. 44
1. Proscription of mandatory capital sentencing provisions
In response to Furman, many state legislatures sought to avoid
eighth amendment limitations by enacting statutes that mandated
capital sentences for certain enumerated offenses. The North Caro-
lina legislature was among those to provide for an entirely
mandatory procedure in order to avoid further constitutional cur-
tailments. 45 In Woodson v. North Carolina,46 the Supreme Court
struck down the North Carolina statute.47 A plurality of the court
found the mandatory provision a violation of the eighth and four-
teenth amendments. 48
Drawing from the decision in Furman, the Woodson plurality con-
cluded "that death is a punishment different from all other sanc-
tions in kind rather than degree." 49 Based on this conclusion, the
plurality found that a sentence of death may be imposed only after
consideration of relevant characteristics specific to the individual of-
fender and to the crime for which he or she was convicted. 50
Mandatory provisions also conflicted with the Court's requirement
that extra care be imposed on all applications of capital
murder); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (striking down statute that mandated
death for five categories of homicide).
44. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1985) (quoting Gregg opinion of Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens as "[a] fair statement of the consensus. ... ); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing "death is different"
doctrine as precedent created by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Woodson).
45. The North Carolina statute required the sentence of death for all defendants con-
victed of first degree murder:
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprison-
ment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony, shall be punished with
de h....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17
(1990)) (emphasis added). See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (plurality opin-
ion) (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., concurring) (1976) (describing North Carolina statute's
mandatory construction). Id at 286-87.
46. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
47. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
48. Id. at 305.
49. Id. at 303-04. The plurality expanded on the emerging "death is different" doctrine
and required heightened due process as a result. Id. at 304-05. The death sentence, even
when compared with a 100-year prison term, was considered qualitatively different because of
its finality. Id. at 305. The plurality in Woodson concluded that the unique status of capital
punishment mandated a corresponding heightened need for reliable application. Id. Thus, a
failure of reliable application renders the sentence cruel and unusual. Id.
50. Id. at 304 (finding that, at minimum, sentencer must consider relevant factors relat-
ing to defendant's character, record, and offense).
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punishment.5 1
The Court concluded that the eighth amendment guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment required the state to employ
civilized standards reflected by contemporary norms when exercis-
ing its power to punish.52 The plurality, citing evidence of unfavor-
able public sentiment regarding mandatory death sentences, 53
concluded that such a statutory scheme was inconsistent with the
requirements of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.5 4 There-
fore, the Court in Woodson concluded that simply converting a capi-
tal sentencing statute from discretionary to mandatory sentencing
did not cure the constitutional defects enunciated in Furman.55 The
plurality suggested that mandatory sentences would result in exces-
sively discretionary sentencing similar to that found invalid in
Furman because juries would acquit guilty defendants to avoid the
automatic imposition of a capital sentence. 56
51. See id. (stating consideration of character or record of defendant along with circum-
stances surrounding offense represent constitutionally indispensable parts of capital sentenc-
ing process).
52. Id. at 288 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)). The
Court examined historical usage, legislative enactments, and prior jury determinations to
measure contemporary norms reflecting public opinion. Id (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-82
(Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., concurring)).
53. See id at 289-98 (finding historical public dissatisfaction with mandatory death pen-
alty statutes because they resulted in limited application and frequent refusal by jurors to
convict defendants in capital crimes cases).
54. See id. at 301 (finding eighth amendment received much of its meaning from evolving
standards of decency in maturing society).
55. See id. at 303 (concluding that North Carolina's statute failed to fulfill basic require-
ment enunciated in Furman).
56. IL at 302-03 (noting that mandatory statutes force juries to "consider the grave con-
sequences of a conviction in reaching a verdict" and, therefore, afford sentencers too much
discretion). The Court invalidated a second mandatory statute with a similar analysis in the
companion case of Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). Unlike the North Carolina stat-
ute's expansive application at issue in Woodson, Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statute
provided a narrower definition of first-degree murder. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 332 (Stewart, Pow-
ell, Stevens,JJ., concurring). The Louisiana statute limited first-degree murder to five catego-
ries of homicide: (1) killing in connection with the commission of certain felonies; (2) killing
of a fireman or a peace officer in the performance of his or her duties; (3) killing for remuner-
ation; (4) killing with the intent to inflict harm on more than one person; and (5) killing by a
person with a prior murder conviction or under a current life sentence. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:30 (West 1974) (current version at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1990)). Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens concluded that, despite the narrower definition of applicable
offenses, the Louisiana statute represented an unconstitutional infringement of the defend-
ant's eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 332-33 (Stewart, Pow-
ell, Stevens, JJ., concurring) (noting narrower list of offenses incorporated into definition of
first-degree murder is not constitutionally significant).
The Louisiana scheme, although mandating capital punishment for convicted first-degree
murderers, also required that the trial judge instruct the jury on the crimes of second-degree
murder and manslaughter. I.A. CODE CrIM. PROC. ANN. Arts. 809, 814(A)(1) (West 1975)
(current version at LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Arts. 809, 814(A)(1) (West 1981)). Applying
the Woodson logic based on the "death is different" doctrine, the Roberts plurality concluded
that this provision encouraged jurors to disregard their oaths and convict certain defendants
of lessor offenses to avoid the imposition of a capital sentence. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-35
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Woodson v. North Carolina strengthened eighth amendment protec-
tions and clearly affirmed the "death is different" doctrine. 57 Of the
two post-Furman statutory options, Woodson invalidated only the pro-
visions that mandated capital sentencing for certain offenses. The
second statutory construction was addressed by three cases decided
concurrently. 58
2. Balancing mitigating and aggravating factors as an acceptable means
for employing capital punishment
In the aftermath of Furman, roughly half the states adopting a new
death penalty statute chose a variation on the Model Penal Code
which required the sentencer to employ enumerated mitigating and
aggravating factors when considering capital punishment.5 9 The
Georgia legislature adopted just such a statute in response to
Furman.60 The new Georgia statute included the following modifica-
tions: limiting the number of crimes subject to capital punishment;
requiring the state to prove at least one enumerated aggravating
factor; allowing the jury to hear the defendant's arguments in miti-
gation; and mandating an automatic appeal process after the imposi-
(Stewart, Powell, Stevens,J., concurring). The Roberts plurality placed great emphasis on the
amount of discretion afforded the sentencing jury under the Louisiana statutory construction.
Id. at 335-36. In addition to inviting a jury to disregard their instructions and enter a guilty
verdict to a lesser offense, the Louisiana statute failed to provide any additional mandatory
review of the sentence to avoid arbitrary results. Id. Because the mandatory death penalty
constructions failed to afford the extra care required by the unique status of capital punish-
ment, all similar statutes were invalidated under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See
id. (noting terminal deficiency in Louisiana's failure to provide mandatory appellate review).
Because the plurality ofJustices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens would not uphold a mandatory
death penalty statute, and because Justices Brennan and Marshall found capital punishment
per se unconstitutional, any statute that could not satisfy the plurality test was destined to fail
if challenged in the Supreme Court.
57. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 n.12 (1987) (employing Woodson plurality's
position that death is different to conclude that admissibility of victim impact statements in
capital sentencing may be different than admissibility of statements relevant to other punish-
ments); Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 423 (1982) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting Woodson
as origin of"death is different" doctrine); see also, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-18
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Woodson for precedent that "sentences of death are
.qualitatively different' from prison sentences").
58. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion) (considering validity of
Georgia's aggravating/mitigating factor guidance construction); Proffltt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976) (plurality opinion) (addressing constitutionality of Florida's capital punishment
provisions wherein statutory aggravating factors are weighed against statutory mitigating fac-
tors);,Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion) (evaluating Texas' interrogatory
procedure for death penalty sentencing).
59. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (discussing immediate legislative re-
sponses to Furman); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193 n.44 (describing statutory construction us-
ing specific factors of aggravation and mitigation to guide sentencers).
60. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2401, 27-2503, 27-2534.1 (1975) (current versions at GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-2, 17-10-30 (1990)) (setting forth post-Furman death penalty provisions
in Georgia).
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tion of any death sentence. 6'
In Gregg v. Georgia,62 a plurality of the Court upheld Georgia's
modified death penalty statute.63 The Court concluded that capital
punishment for the crime of murder did not represent a per se viola-
tion of the eighth amendment. 64 The Georgia statute withstood
constitutional scrutiny because it provided additional safeguards
and focused sentencer consideration on specific factors. 65 This
heightened due process emphasized the special nature of capital
sentencing and distinguished the Georgia statute from the
mandatory construction previously invalidated in Woodson.66
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens concluded that the mere ac-
commodation of sentencing discretion did not, in and of itself, con-
stitute a violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendment
protections against cruel and unusual punishment.67 In Gregg, the
Court clarified its concern for guided discretion in death penalty
cases. Decisions to impose capital punishment, the Court reasoned,
should not be made under a system that creates a substantial risk of
prejudicial impulse or arbitrariness.68
Although Gregg and its two companion cases6 9 upheld the post-
61. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2401 (1975) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-2
(1990)) (requiring that state prove at least one enumerated aggravating factor, allowing con-
sideration of additional evidence of mitigation and aggravation, and requiring that jury or
judge hear defendant's arguments); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1975) (current ver-
sion at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1990)) (enumerating ten aggravating circumstances and
requiring sentencer to indicate which aggravating circumstances are proven beyond reason-
able doubt to ratify death sentence).
The Georgia Supreme Court, when considering an automatic appeal, was statutorily re-
quired to make three determinations: (1) whether the sentence was imposed because of pas-
sion, prejudice, or some other arbitrary influence; (2) whether the evidence presented to the
sentencer justified the finding of an aggravating circumstance; and (3) whether the sentence
was disproportionate to sentences assessed in similar situations. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
2537(C)(3) (1975) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c) (1990)) (prescribing
mandatory appellate review).
62. 428 U.S. 153 (plurality opinion), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
63. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 154 (plurality opinion), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875
(1976).
64. Id. at 176-78.
65. Id. at 204-06 (examining Georgia statute's mandatory appellate review designed to
protect against capricious sentencing or prejudicial jury).
66. See id. at 206-07 (concluding that additional legislative guidelines in Georgia statute
and mandatory appellate review satisfied eighth amendment requirements expressed in
Furman); see also supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Woodson).
67. d at 199.
68. Id. at 193-95. Justices White, Rehnquist, and ChiefJustice Burger concurred in the
judgment, noting that the Georgia statute provided sufficient safeguards to guide juries in
capital sentencing without the risk of arbitrary or capricious results. IdL at 222-23 (White,
Rehnquist, JJ., Burger, CJ., concurring).
69. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252-53 (1976) (upholding statute requiring ju-
ries, in rendering advisory verdict, and trialjudges, in imposing sentence, to consider specific
aggravating and mitigating circumstances). As in Gregg, Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens
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Furman capital sentencing statutes, the "death is different" doctrine
found that the specific delineation of mitigating and aggravating factors satisfied the require-
ments of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251. By requiring that
the sentencer consider specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the statute focused
sentencer evaluation on the crime and the character of the convicted defendant. Id. at 251-52.
The Florida statute at issue in Proffit enumerated eight aggravating factors and seven miti-
gating factors. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(5), 921.141(6) (West Supp. 1976-77) (current ver-
sion at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(5), 921.141(6) (West 1990)). The statute also required the
trial judge to consider those factors in determining whether or not the death penalty was
appropriate given the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant. Id.
§ 921.141(3). The Florida construction, like the Georgia statute upheld in Gregg, provided an
additional safeguard of automatic appellate review of the trial judge's capital sentence to en-
sure consistency with sentences previously imposed in similar cases. Id. § 921,141(4).
Unlike the Georgia statute, however, the Florida law did not require the appellate court to
conduct any particular type of review. See Profitt, 428 U.S. at 250-51 (describing automatic
review by Florida Supreme Court); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West Supp. 1976-1977)
(current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West 1990)). Despite this lack of clarity, the
Court was impressed with Florida's automatic review procedure and its consideration of con-
sistent sentencing in similar cases. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251 (characterizing role of appellate
review as guaranteeing that facts cited as justification for death sentence are consistent with
prior applications) (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
943 (1974)). The Court also noted that the sentence review provision distinguished the Flor-
ida statute from those found unconstitutional because it diminished the risk of arbitrary or
capricious capital sentencing. Id.
In the final companion case, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), the Court affirmed the
capital sentence of a defendant convicted under a distinctive capital sentencing statute. The
Texas statute at issue had three provisions all of which together satisfied the eighth amend-
ment requirements: (1) death sentences could only be imposed against defendants convicted
of one of five specific intentional and knowing instances of homicide; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03 (Vernon 1974) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1989));
(2) juries were required to answer certain questions designed to focus attention on the de-
fendant's offense and future dangerousness; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. § 37.071(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1975-1976) (current version at TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071(b)
(Vernon 1989)); and (3) the death penalty could only be imposed if the questions were an-
swered in a certain way. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071(e) (Vernon Supp. 1975-1976)
(current version at TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071(e) (Vernon 1989)). The Texas
statute also required automatic appeals from capital sentences to ensure fair and consistent
results. Id. § 37.071 (f); seeJurek, 428 U.S. at 268-69 (discussing capital sentencing procedure).
Despite the lack of enumerated mitigating and aggravating factors, the Court inJurek found
the narrow statutory category of crimes suitable for capital sentencing sufficient to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276. The "interrogatory method" ofjudicial gui-
dance conformed to eighth amendment requirements because it focused the jury's considera-
tion on express circumstances and on factors specific to the individual defendant. Id. at 273-
74. The Texas statute permitted the imposition of a capital sentence only after a jury had
answered all three of the following inquiries in the affirmative:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability that the defend-
ant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1975-1976) (current version at TEx.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071(b) (Vernon 1989)).
If the jury found that any of the above considerations could not be answered affirmatively
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant would be sentenced automatically to life imprison-
ment. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071(c), (e) (Vernon Supp. 1975-1976) (current ver-
sion at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. § 37.07 1(c), (e) (Vernon 1989)). Because the sentencer
focused on the individualized circumstances of each case, the statutory construction adhered
to the eighth amendment requirements set forth in Furman and Woodson. Jurek, 428 U.S. at
Walton v. Arizona
remained intact. The Court again prefaced its evaluation of death
penalty statutes by indicating the fundamental distinction of that
sentence from all others. 70 The Court found that a state could con-
form to eighth amendment limitations by allowing sentencer consid-
eration of enumerated aggravating and mitigating factors, thereby
protecting against capricious or prejudicial decisions and affording a
heightened version of due process. 71 The Georgia statute, which
contained an automatic appeal provision, did not extend unguided
discretion to the capital sentencer.72 The Court upheld the Georgia
statute because it provided for an individualized sentence by requir-
ing the state to prove at least one enumerated aggravating factor
specific to the crime at issue. 7
3
C. Requirement of Individualized Sentencing
After the Supreme Court handed down the five decisions in 1976,
death penalty statutes had to satisfy two prongs of eighth amend-
ment jurisprudence based on the premise that death is a qualita-
tively different form of punishment. First, a death penalty statute
could not permit unguided sentencing discretion. 74 Second, a capi-
tal punishment law was required to afford an individualized determi-
nation of punishment specific to the defendant and the crime
committed. 75 By requiring an individualized sentence for capital de-
fendants, the Court affirmed and strengthened its prior doctrine dis-
tinguishing the nature of death from all other penalties. 76 While
this second eighth amendment prong originated in Woodson, the
273-74. The Texas formulation did not extend unguided discretion to the sentencer or hin-
der individualized sentencing determinations. Id. at 276.
70. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting that "pun-
ishment of death is different in kind from any other punishment" and then addressing consti-
tutionality of Georgia statute).
71. See id. at 206-07 (stressing importance of guidance provisions to avoid capricious
sentencing and inherent constitutional defects).
72. Id.
73. See id. (concluding that Georgia statute was constitutional because sentencing proce-
dures focused jury's attention on particularized nature of crime).
74. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (plurality opinion) (stating that
discretionary capital punishment statutes violate eighth amendment cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause).
75. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (requir-
ing that death penalty provision provide for individualized sentencing).
76. See id. at 305 (finding that individualized sentencing requirement stems from pre-
sumption that death is qualitatively different from any sentence of imprisonment); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (stressing distinction between death penalty and other
sentences);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (WhiteJ., concurring in judgment) (em-
phasizing that Texas statute limits application of death sentence to narrowly defined group of
most brutal crimes).
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Court clarified the individualized sentencing requirement in Lockett
v. Ohio.
77
Ohio responded to the Furman decision by enacting a statute with
a modified version of the Model Penal Code aggravating/mitigating
factor construction. 78 The Ohio statute required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of at least one of seven enumerated aggravating
factors before the death penalty could be imposed. 79 After the state
had proven one of the aggravating factors, the Ohio statute man-
dated a sentence of death unless the defendant could prove by a
preponderance of the evidence one of three specific mitigating
factors.80
In a plurality opinion, the Court invalidated the Ohio death pen-
alty statute because it unconstitutionally restricted the mitigating
factors a jury could consider in making its sentencing determina-
tion.8 1 Reiterating the special nature of a capital sentence first de-
clared in Woodson,8 2 the Lockett plurality clarified the eighth
amendment requirement of individualized sentencing. 8 Taking the
Woodson reasoning one step further, the Lockett plurality concluded
that statutes could not limit the number of mitigating factors a jury
may consider in making a sentencing determination without running
afoul of the eighth amendment.8 4 The Court based this new re-
quirement on the fundamental concept that the death penalty is so
extreme that it is differentiated from all other penalties.8 5
77. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
78. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03, 2929.04 (Baldwin 1975) (current version at
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03, 2929.04 (Baldwin 1991)) (setting forth procedures and
conditions for imposition of death penalty in Ohio).
79. Id. § 2929.04. The seven aggravating factors included: (1) assassination of the Pres-
ident or political figure; (2) murder committed for hire; (3) murder committed during escape
from custody; (4) murder committed while detained; (5) murder or attempt to murder two or
more persons or prior conviction of offender for similar offense; (6) murder of a law enforce-
ment officer; or (7) murder in connection with kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggra-
vated robbery, or aggravated burglary. Id.
80. OFHo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-2929.04(B) (Baldwin 1975) (current version at
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-2929.04 (Baldwin 1991)). The Ohio statute specified the
following three mitigating factors forjuries to consider: (1) the victim facilitated or induced
the killing; (2) the defendant had been under duress, coercion, or extreme provocation at the
time of the crime and was unlikely to have committed the crime under normal circumstances;
and (3) the crime resulted primarily from a psychosis or mental deficiency. Id.
§ 2929.04(B)(1)-(3).
81. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607-08 (1978) (plurality opinion).
82. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion) (re-
quiring reliable sentencing in capital punishment cases due to finality of death).
83. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05.
84. Id.
85. Id. (recognizing that individualized sentencing in noncapital cases is governed by
public policy rather than by constitutional mandate). The Court distinguished capital cases
under the "death is different" principle: "Given that the imposition of death by a public
authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion
that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases." Id. at 605. Specifically, the Court
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After Furman, Woodson, and Lockett, the Court continued to de-
velop eighth amendment guidelines. 86 With each new development
and clarification the Court was careful not to depart from the under-
lying principle that death is different. 87 In Walton v. Arizona,8" how-
ever, a new Supreme Court summarily overruled fifteen years of
precedent by rejecting the "death is different" doctrine.
II. WALTON V. ARIZONA
A. Facts of the Case
On March 2, 1986, Jeffrey Walton, Robert Hoover, and Sherold
Ramsey agreed to commit a robbery.8 9 That night, the three waited
outside a Tucson, Arizona bar for a victim. 90 The threesome
robbed and murdered the first person to emerge.91
A jury convicted Jeffrey Walton of first degree murder primarily
through the immunized testimony of codefendant Ramsey, a con-
noted that noncapital cases provide many post-conviction remedies unavailable to the capital
defendant including probation, parole, and work furloughs.
86. See Annotation, Constitutionality of Death Penalty, supra note 26, at 1064-67 (summariz-
ing post-Lockett mitigating circumstance jurisprudence). Subsequent cases served to refine
and clarify the mitigating circumstances evaluation requirements originally established by
Lockett. See generally Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (invalidating sentence of death
imposed after judge refused to consider defendant's evidence of difficult family history and
emotional disturbance as relevant mitigating factors); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1
(1986) (finding that trial court's exclusion from sentencing hearing of testimony concerning
defendant's good behavior in jail violated principles defined in Lockett); Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367 (1988) (vacating death sentence after judge's instruction was interpreted to require
jury unanimity with regard to validity of defendant's mitigating circumstances).
Writing for a plurality of the Court,Justice Powell found that "[j]ust as the State may not by
statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sen-
tencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence." Eddings, 455
U.S. at 113-14 (emphasis in original). The Court's expansion of the Lockett rule in Eddings was
given further weight in subsequent applications. For example, in Shipper v. South Carolina, the
Court concluded that "the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from consid-
ering 'any relevant mitigating evidence.'" Shipper, 476 U.S. at 4 (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at
114). Finally, in Mills v. Maryland, the Court invalidated a capital sentencing statute, citing the
Lockett rule that a capital sentencer may not be precluded from considering any relevant miti-
gating evidence. Mills, 486 U.S. at 384.
87. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that death
penalty is different from other sentences and requires extraordinary measures to guarantee
that "sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake").
88. 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
89. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3052 (1990) (plurality opinion).
90. Id.
91. Id. Thomas Powell, an off-duty Marine home on leave, emerged from the bar and
headed for his car. Id. Walton and his accomplices robbed Powell at gunpoint and ordered
him to get in the back seat of the car. Id. Walton drove the car to a place known as Gates Pass
where Powell was ordered out of the car and forced to lay down on the ground. Respondent's
Brief on the Merits at 1, Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990). Walton forced Powell to
get up and marched him into the desert. After walking a short distance, Walton shot Powell
once in the back of the head. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3052. The medical examiner's report
indicated that the single shot was not fatal, but that Powell died from dehydration, starvation,
and pneumonia several days after the shooting. Id.
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victed felon, and Walton's own testimony. 92 It was apparent that
the jury was not certain whether Hoover or Walton had actually pul-
led the trigger, but the judge's instruction on felony-murder made
that distinction irrelevant.95 Hoover was convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
94
Pursuant to the Arizona statute, the trial judge conducted a sepa-
rate "aggravation/mitigation hearing" without a jury. 95 The state
presented two aggravating circumstances to justify a sentence of
death: (1) that the murder was committed "in an especially hei-
nous, cruel or depraved manner," and (2) that the murder was com-
mitted for pecuniary gain.96 As mitigating factors, Walton
presented psychiatric testimony indicating an extensive history of
substance abuse that may have impaired his judgment at the time of
the murder, evidence pointing to a history of sexual abuse as a child,
and a suggestion that his young age justified a sentence of imprison-
ment.97 Immediately after the closing arguments, the trial judge
sentenced Jeffrey Walton to death. 9
8
B. The Arizona Death Penalty Statute
The principle issue in Walton concerned whether the Arizona stat-
utory provisions violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 99
92. See Brief for Petitioner at 5, 8, Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
93. Id. at 8. During thejury's deliberation on the guilt phase, the following question was
presented to thejudge: "For a person to be guilty of felony murder, does he actually have to
pull the trigger?" Id. at 9 (citing Joint Appendix at 43). The court responded that the jury
should "review the felony murder instructions and the accomplice instructions." Id. The
guilty verdict followed soon after the judge's response. Id.; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1105 (Supp. 1988) (defining crimes punishable by death and including offense of rob-
bery in which defendant or another person causes the death of any person). The Supreme
Court's treatment of Arizona's felony murder provision has received extensive attention. See
generally Gallaway, Felony-Murder Death Sentence: The Tison Brothers'Intent to Kill, 27 ARIZ. L. REV.
889 (1985) (examining Court's decision upholding Arizona's capital punishment provision
incorporating felony murder); Note, Tison v. Arizona: A General Intent for Imposing Capital Pun-
ishment Upon an Accomplice Felony Murderer, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 255 (1988) (discussing constitu-
tionality of Arizona's statutory provision permitting death sentence for felony murder); Note,
Redefining a Culpable Mental StateforNon-Triggermen Fadng the Death Penalty, 33 VILL. L. REv. 367
(1988) (investigating Supreme Court's decision upholding capital sentencing of defendant
despite lack of intent or commission of murder).
94. State v. Hoover, 151 Ariz. 470, 472, 728 P.2d 689, 691 (1989).
95. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3052 (1990) (plurality opinon).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3052-53. The Arizona statute listed five factors to be considered as mitigating
circumstances. The fifth factor stated only "[t]he defendant's age" without further clarifica-
tion. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(5) (Supp. 1988). The defendant introduced mitigat-
ing evidence that he was 20 years old at the time of sentencing. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3052-53.
98. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3053.
99. Id. at 3051. The Arizona statute that defines capital sentencing requirements and
guidelines reads, in relevant part, as follows:
B. When a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to first degree murder...
the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered...
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The distinction between the Arizona statute and other capital sen-
tencing guidelines was its approach to the aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances analysis. Unlike other statutory constructions
shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence or nonexis-
tence of the circumstances included in subsection F and G of this section, for the
purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed. The hearing shall be conducted
before the court alone.
C. In the sentencing hearing... [t]he burden of establishing the existence of any of
the [aggravating] circumstances set forth in subsection F of this section is on the
prosecution. The burden of establishing the existence of the [mitigating] circumstances included
in subsection G of this section is on the defendant.
D. The court shall return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to the exist-
ence or nonexistence of each of the circumstances set forth in subsection F of this
section and as to the existence of any of the circumstances included in subsection G
of this section.
E. In determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment...
the court shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in-
cluded in subsections F and G of this section and shall impose a sentence of death if the
court finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection F of this section
and that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
F. Aggravating circumstances to be considered shall be the following:
1. The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States
for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was
imposable.
2. The defendant was previously convicted of a felony in the United States in-
volving the use or threat of violence on another person.
3. In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave
risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the victim of the
offense.
4. The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or
promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.
5. The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in
expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
6. The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or de-
praved manner.
7. The defendant committed the offense while in the custody of the state de-
partment of corrections, a law enforcement agency or county or city jail.
8. The defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides . . .
which were committed during the commission of the offense.
9. The defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed or was
tried as an adult and the victim was under fifteen years of age.
10. The murdered individual was an on-duty peace officer who was killed in the
course of performing his official duties and the defendant knew, or should have
known, that the victim was a peace officer.
G. Mitigating circumstances shall be any factors proffered by the defendant or the
state which are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than
death, including any aspect of the defendant's character, propensities or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense, including but not limited to the following:
I. The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired. ...
2. The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress....
3. The defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another.. .but his
participation was relatively minor ....
4. The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in the
course of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was convicted
would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.
5. The defendant's age.
ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
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previously addressed by the Court, the Arizona law placed a burden
on the defendant to establish "mitigating circumstances sufficiently
substantial to call for leniency" if the state proved at least one of the
enumerated aggravating circumstances. 100
The Arizona Supreme Court has consistently noted that mitigat-
ing circumstances are not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency
unless they outweigh the aggravating circumstances presented by
the state. 101 The Arizona court further clarified this point by finding
that "[w]hen the issue of guilt is settled and only the question of
punishment remains, due process is not offended by requiring the
already guilty defendant to carry the burden of showing why he
should receive leniency."' 02
C. The Opinion of the Court
In evaluating the Arizona statute, the Supreme Court in Walton v.
Arizona 103 considered two issues significant to the development of a
mitigating factor evaluation in capital sentencing: (1) whether a
statute permitting sentencers to consider only mitigating factors
that have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence is consti-
tutional; and (2) whether the Arizona statute's language creates an
100. Compare Asiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 1988) (allocating burden of show-
ing mitigating factors "substantially sufficient to call for leniency" to defendant if court finds
"one or more ... aggravating circumstances .. ") with GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (b) (Supp.
1975) (requiring that "judge shall consider [or include instruction for jury to consider] ...
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.. ." without allocating burden) and OHiO REV.
CODE § 2929.04(B)(I)-(3) (Baldwin 1975) (placing burden on defendant to show by prepon-
derance of evidence existence of specified mitigating factors). The Ohio statute at issue in
Lockett was not invalidated because it allocated the "risk of nonpersuasion" to the defendant,
but rather because it limited the types of mitigating circumstances to be considered. See Wal-
ton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3055 (1990) (distinguishing statute at issue in Walton from
statute in Lockett (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 609 & n. 16) (1978) (plurality opinion)).
101. See, e.g., State v. McCall, 160 Ariz. 119, 125, 770 P.2d 1165, 1171 (1989) (upholding
decision that letter from corrections officer attesting to defendant's behavior did not outweigh
aggravating circumstances); State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz. 186, 208, 766 P.2d 59, 81 (1988) (find-
ing that one mitigating factor, defendant's incapacity to control his own conduct, substantially
outweighed aggravating circumstances of prior conviction and especially heinous manner);
State v. Moorman, 154 Ariz. 578, 587, 744 P.2d 679, 688 (1987) (holding that three aggravat-
ing factors outweigh single mitigating factor of "significant impairment"); State v. LaGrand,
153 Ariz. 21, 37, 734 P.2d 563, 579 (holding that mitigating factors of "defendants' ages, their
prior home lives, and their remorse" did not outweigh aggravating circumstances of prior
conviction, expectation of pecuniary gain, and "especially heinous, cruel or depraved man-
ner"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987); State v. McMurtrey, 151 Ariz. 105, 110, 726 P.2d 202,
207 (1986) (finding that mitigating factors were not substantial enough to outweigh aggravat-
ing circumstances), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 911 (1987).
102. State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 447, 586 P.2d 1253, 1259 (1989).
103. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990) (plurality opinion). Justice White deliv-
ered the judgment of the Court in an opinion joined in its entirety by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and ChiefJustice Rehnquist. Id. at 3051. Justice Scaliajoined in part, concurred in
part, and concurred in the judgment. Id. at 3051, 3058.
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impermissible presumption that the death penalty is appropriate. 10 4
These considerations implicitly challenge the "death is different"
doctrine and represent a potential retreat from precedent requiring
a heightened due process for death penalty cases.
1. Constitutionality of assigning preponderance burden to presentation of
mitigating factors
The Arizona statute at issue in Walton required the trial judge, as
sentencer, to consider only those mitigating circumstances that had
been established by a preponderance of the evidence and were "suf-
ficiently substantial to call for leniency."10 5 Justice White, in deliv-
104. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3054-56. The Court rejected two other arguments by Walton:
(1) whether Arizona's delegation of sentencing and mitigating factor analysis to the trial
judge rather than the jury is permissible under the sixth amendment entitlement to a jury
trial; and (2) whether the statute's definition of an aggravating factor as "especially heinous,
cruel or depraved" properly guides the sentencer's discretion. Id. at 3054-57.
Walton's sixth amendment argument suggested that every issue concerning the finding of
fact must be decided by a jury. Id. at 3054. The Arizona statute, however, delegated the
entire sentencing process to the judge including the fact-finding mitigating circumstance anal-
ysis. ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (1989); see supra note 99 (quoting from relevant por-
tion of Arizona statute). Walton contended that a jury must make the determination
concerning which relevant mitigating and aggravating factors exist before the judge renders a
sentence. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3054. Unlike other statutes delegating sentencing decisions to
a judge, the Arizona statute provided no process for jury recommendation or input in the
sentencing phase. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (1989).
The majority placed little credence on Walton's attempt to distinguish the Arizona statute
from other state statutes previously upheld by the Court which delegate capital sentencing to
judges. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3054. Citing Florida's jury recommendation provision as repre-
sentative, the Supreme Court noted that even statutes that provide for jury recommendation
do not make such findings binding on the trial judge's sentencing determination. Id. Finally,
the Court cited Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989), in concluding that the sixth amend-
ment does not require the specific findings which authorize the imposition of the death sen-
tence to be made by the jury. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3054.
Walton also contended that the definition of aggravating circumstances, provided in the
statute and under which he was sentenced, failed to properly guide the sentencer's discretion
as required by the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 3056-57. Walton relied on May-
nard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980),
wherein the Supreme Court had struck down similar aggravating circumstance definitions in
the Oklahoma and Georgia statutes respectively. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3057.
Walton was sentenced to death on the judge's finding that he "committed the offense in an
especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner." See ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6)
(1987) (delineating aggravating circumstances under Arizona law). In Maynard, the Court
struck down an aggravating circumstance provision which warranted a death sentence for
crimes which were "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Maynard, 486 U.S. at 359. The
Court in Godfrey found Georgia's provision of "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or in-
human" to be equally unconstitutional as applied in that case. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422.
The Court distinguished the Arizona statutory construction from those at issue in Maynard
and Godfrey. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3057. In the two prior cases, the jurors were not instructed
beyond the "bare terms" of the statutory language. Id. The Court found that since Walton
was sentenced by a trial judge aware of the constitutional limitations on aggravating circum-
stance analysis, his case was distinguishable from Maynard and Godfrey. Id. The majority con-
cluded that "[t]rial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their
decisions." Id. Therefore, the statute need not be more clear because the trial judge, as
sentencer, would be aware of any limitations mandated by the eighth amendment. Id.
105. See Akiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (1989) (proclaiming that burden of establish-
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ering the Court's opinion, distinguished the Arizona statute from
the law struck down by the Court in Lockett. 106 In Lockett, the
Supreme Court invalidated the Ohio death penalty statute because
it restricted the mitigating circumstances a capital sentencer could
consider. 107 Justice White distinguished Walton by framing the issue
as one concerning a criminal defendant's burden of proof rather
than one involving the preclusion of mitigating evidence.' 08
Justice White reasoned that three prior decisions by the Court up-
holding various statutorily-mandated burdens on criminal defend-
ants controlled the result in Walton.109 In the first case, Martin v.
Ohio,l"0 the Court upheld a provision requiring a homicide defend-
ant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was
acting in self-defense when the murder was allegedly committed."I'
In the second case, Leland v. Oregon, 12 the Court upheld a require-
ment that a defense of insanity be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt by a criminal defendant."13 Finally, the Walton majority cited
Patterson v. New York 114 in which the Court found that the assign-
ment of a preponderance burden to a defendant asserting an affirm-
ative defense of extreme emotional disturbance did not conflict with
the right to due process.' 15 Justice White used these cases to sup-
port the proposition that as long as the state did not lessen the pros-
ecutor's burden to prove every element of an offense or to prove the
existence of aggravating circumstances, then a defendant's constitu-
tional rights were not violated by requiring proof of mitigating cir-
cumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. 61 6
In addition to requiring proof of mitigating circumstances by a
preponderance of evidence, the Arizona law further limited a sen-
tencer's consideration to only those mitigating circumstances suffi-
ing existence of mitigating circumstances is on defendant); State v. McMurtrey, 143 Ariz. 71,
73, 691 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1984), aff'd, 726 P.2d 202 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911 (1987)
(interpreting statute as requiring defendant to establish mitigating circumstances by prepon-
derance of evidence).
106. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055 (determining that Walton's claim concerned burden of
proof, not exclusion of mitigating evidence).
107. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 80-86 (discussing Lockett decision and its contribution to mitigating factor
analysis jurisprudence).
108. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055.
109. Id.
110. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
111. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1987).
112. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
113. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798-99 (1952).
114. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
115. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977).
116. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3055 (1990) (plurality opinion).
1410
1991] Walton v. Arizona 1411
ciently substantial to call for leniency.' 17 In upholding this statute,
the Court distinguished the Arizona law from those struck down in
Mullaney v. Wilbur' I s and Mills v. Maryland.119 In Mullaney, the Court
invalidated a statute requiring convicted murder defendants to af-
firmatively disprove an element of murder in order to receive the
reduced sentence of voluntary manslaughter. 20 The Court in Wal-
ton reasoned that Arizona's "sufficiently substantial" provision and
its limitation on the mitigating circumstance analysis was not analo-
gous to the Mullaney statute's limitation on a state's burden to estab-
lish all of the elements of a crime. 12 1 Justice White concluded that
finding Mullaney applicable would create a constitutional mandate
that a sentencer consider all mitigating factors presented by the de-
fendant unless negated by the state by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.' 22 The Court declined to endorse this concept.
23
In Mills, the Court invalidated a death penalty statute that ap-
peared to preclude consideration of a mitigating factor unless the
jurors unanimously agreed that the factor was valid. 124 The Court
in Walton first distinguished Mills by noting that the Arizona statute
delegated sentencing authority to the trial judge, thereby eliminat-
ing the concern about jury instructions prevalent in Mills. 12 5 In ad-
dition, the Court noted that Mills did not forbid the requirement
that each individual juror find a mitigating circumstance established
117. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (1987); see supra notes 99-102 and accompanying
text (discussing Arizona statute).
118. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
119. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
120. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975). In Mullaney, the Supreme Court
found unconstitutional a Maine statute requiring a murder defendant to prove that he acted in
the heat of passion in order to reduce a homicide conviction mandating life imprisonment to
manslaughter which carried a sentence not greater than twenty years. Id. at 684. The Maine
provision was deemed to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
704. The Court reasoned that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element
necessary to constitute the crime charged. Id. at 703-04 (noting Justice Harlan's sentiments
that "it is far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as a murderer than to sen-
tence a murderer for the lesser crime of manslaughter") (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
372 (1970) (concurring opinion)).
121. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3055 (1990) (plurality opinion) (1990) (finding




124. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384. Mills involved an appeal from a capital sen-
tence imposed after the petitioner was convicted of murdering a fellow prison inmate. Id. at
369. The Maryland scheme under which the petitioner was sentenced provided a verdict form
in which mitigating factors were listed next to "yes" and "no" boxes. See id. at 387-89 (pro-
viding reproduction of verdict form). The instructions to the mitigating evidence section ap-
peared to require juror unanimity before either box could be checked. Id. at 377-78.
Reaffirming the notion that capital sentencers must be permitted to consider all mitigating
factors, the Court vacated the capital sentence. Id. at 384.,
125. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055-56.
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by a preponderance of the evidence. 1
26
2. The presumption of death
Walton's second challenge to the Arizona statute attacked the
provision requiring the imposition of a capital sentence if mitigating
evidence is not established "sufficiently substantial to call for leni-
ency" because it created an unconstitutional presumption that death
is the appropriate sentence. 127 The Court cited Blystone v. Penn-
sylvania 128 and Boyde v. California 129 as precedent precluding such a
challenge. 13
0
In Blystone, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute requiring the
imposition of a capital sentence if the state established at least one
aggravating factor and the jury found no applicable mitigating cir-
cumstances.' 31 The Blystone Court found the Pennsylvania statute
outside the category of "impermissibly mandatory" death penalty
statutes invalidated in Woodson because it did not automatically im-
pose the death penalty for a certain crime.1 32 Applying the Blystone
analysis, the Court in Walton concluded that the Arizona statute did
not afford an excessive amount of discretion to the sentencer.
3 3
The Court's companion decision, Boyde v. California, upheld a Cali-
fornia jury instruction which mandated a capital sentence if aggra-
vating circumstances outweighed mitigating factors. 13 4 The Court
equated the Arizona statute's provision at issue in Walton to the
challenged procedure in Boyde and therefore concluded that the Ari-
zona provision was not constitutionally defective.13
5
126. Id. at 3056.
127. Id.
128. 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990).
129. 110S. Ct. 1190, reh'g denied, 110S. Ct. 1961 (1990).
130. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3056.
131. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078, 1084 (1990); see also 42 PA. CONST. STAT.
§ 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1988) (imposing sentence of death if jury unanimously finds at least one
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances or jury unanimously finds that ag-
gravating circumstances outweigh mitigating factors).
132. Blystone, 110 S. Ct. at 1082. In addition, the Court in Blystone concluded that the
Pennsylvania statute did not violate the constitutional requirement of an individualized sen-
tence because the sentencer was not precluded from considering any type of mitigating evi-
dence. Id. at 1082-83.
133. See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3056 (finding that death penalty statute did not automatically
run afoul of eighth amendment by requiring certain sentence) (citing Woodson v. North Car-
olina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The Court concluded that only when the
sentence is mandated in response to a particular factual scenario does it infringe the individu-
alized sentence required by eighth amendment precedent. Id.
134. Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1195-96 (1990). The Californiajury instruction
commanded: "[ilf you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death." Id. (emphasis omitted).
135. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3056.
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D. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Although Justice Scalia joined the Court's judgment and much of
the majority opinion, he did notjoin the Court's opinion concerning
the defendant's preponderance burden or the presumption of death
issues.136 Justice Scalia's concurrence was premised on the belief
that capital sentencing jurisprudence has developed along two sepa-
rate and conflicting lines: one "requiring constraints on the sen-
tencer's discretion to 'impose' the death penalty"1 37 and the other
"forbidding constraints on the sentencer's discretion to 'decline to
impose' it." s138 Justice Scalia equated the Supreme Court's prior at-
tempts to harmonize these diametrically opposing goals with an at-
tempt to simultaneously promote the ends of good and evil.139
After a detailed review of the capital sentencing doctrines, Justice
Scalia concluded that the contradictory directives could not coexist
in one viable body of law.140 According to Justice Scalia, the contra-
diction has provided ample grounds for defense counsel to file a
"flood-tide of stay applications and petitions for certiorari to review
adverse judgments," that has created a judicial backlog of capital
cases and an endless delay in execution timetables.
14'
After concluding that the two lines of capital sentencing doctrines
could not coexist, Justice Scalia reevaluated the logic of both, begin-
ning with the Court's initial interpretation of the eighth amend-
ment.142 Justice Scalia interpreted the eighth amendment as not
prohibiting a punishment, "no matter how cruel ajudge might think
it to be," unless it is also unusual. 143 The Scalia concurrence reaf-
firmed the Court's analysis in Furman v. Georgia, finding a constitu-
tional prohibition in the eighth amendment against unfettered
capital sentencing discretion.144 In ratifying the Furman decision,
136. Id. at 3059 (Scalia, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 3061 (Scalia, J., concurring).
138. Id. (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (Scalia, J., concurring), reh'g denied,
482 U.S. 920 (1987)).
139. Id. at 3063 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 3064 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (stating that discretion to impose capital sentence
is constrained and discretion to avoid capital sentence is expansive).
141. Id. at 3065 (Scalia, J., concurring). In May 1990, there were 2,327 inmates on death
row, with only 123 executed since 1972. Id. at 3066 (citing NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Death Row, U.S.A. 1 (1990)). The average execution in the United States occurs
eight years after the commission of the crime. Powell, Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1035, 1038 n.26 (1989) (citing E. Carnes & S. Stewart, Summary of Post-Furman Capital Pun-
ishment Data § VIII (unpublished report by Alabama Assistant Attorneys General on file with
Harvard Law School Library, 1988)).
142. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3066-67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 3066 (Scalia, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 3067 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia had personal reservations about
interpreting "unusual" to mean the rare imposition of punishment, but found this definition
in Furman arguably supportable. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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however, Justice Scalia found no justification for continuing to apply
the line of cases requiring individualized capital sentencing. 145 In
so doing, Justice Scalia declared that he would no longer apply the
principles and precedent from Woodson, Lockett or any of their
progeny.146
Following his reconstruction of death penalty jurisprudence, Jus-
tice Scalia briefly evaluated the Arizona statute at issue in Walton.1
47
Under Justice Scalia's interpretation, Arizona's aggravating factors
provided sufficient guidance for a sentencer to distinguish an appro-
priate capital crime from a non-capital crime. 148 Furthermore, since
Justice Scalia found the Woodson-Lockett individualization cases no
longer applicable, he found no constitutional violation in the Ari-
zona statute's provision concerning the mitigating circumstance
evaluation.1
4 9
E. The Dissenting Opinions
Three dissents were filed in Walton.' 50 Justice Brennan prefaced
his attack on the Court's retreat from established precedent by reit-
erating his continuing belief that the death penalty is per se uncon-
stitutional.' 5 ' Justice Brennan admonished the majority and
accused them of facilitating the execution of capital defendants
"with as little interference as possible from our established Eighth
Amendment doctrine."' 15 2
Justice Blackmun filed the main dissent which sharply criticized
145. Id. at 3067-68 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that line of cases unrelated to eighth
amendment).
146. Id. at 3068 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted, "Accordingly, I will not, in
this case or in the future, vote to uphold an Eighth Amendment claim that the sentencer's
discretion has been unlawfully restricted." Id. (Scalia,J., concurring). See generally supra notes
46-58 and accompanying text (discussing Woodson decision) and notes 77-87 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Lockett decision).
147. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
148. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding aggravating circumstance definition as precise
enough to guide sentencer and enable review of sentence).
149. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 3068 (Brennan,J., dissenting); id. at 3070 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); id. at 3086
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 3068-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan quoted a lengthy passage
from his dissent in Gregg, the first post-Furman case to uphold a capital punishment statute
under the eighth amendment. Id. The basis for his dissent was his belief that capital punish-
ment is cruel and unusual because it treats "members of the human race as nonhumans, as
objects to be toyed with and discarded." Id. at 3969 (quoting Gregg v . Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 230-31, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976)).
152. Id. at 3070 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cited several other recent cases
exhibiting the Supreme Court's retreat from settled eighth amendment precedent. Id. at 3068
(citing Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990); Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190,
reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 1961 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, reh 'gdenied, 110 S. Ct. 1960
(1990); Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 17 (1990) as cases allowing
death sentence to be imposed without consideration of individual circumstances).
Walton v. Arizona
the Court's logic in citing non-capital cases as justification for a de-
parture from established eighth amendment precedent. 153 Justice
Blackmun concluded that the Arizona statute should be invalidated
because it precluded sentencer consideration of mitigating evi-
dence. 154 More than half of the Blackmun dissent was devoted to
one of the aggravating circumstances, statutorily-defined as any
murder committed in "an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved
manner," under which the defendant was sentenced to death. 55
Justice Blackmun criticized the statutory definition as encouraging
arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty and found
it lacked constitutionally-mandated clarity. 156 Justice Blackmun
concluded by accusing the Court of abandoning its constitutional
duty to regulate abusive application of the death penalty.157
Justice Stevens, in addition to joining Justice Blackmun's dissent,
153. See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3071-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that Court's reli-
ance on Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) is misplaced because it is a non-capital
case).
154. See id. at 3074 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding Arizona provision within prohibi-
tion announced by Lockett and subsequent cases).
155. See id. at 3077-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (addressing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
703(F)(6) which defines aggravating circumstance as any murder committed in "especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved manner").
156. Id. at 3077-82. The determination of an aggravating circumstance definition is both
crucial and complex. See, e.g., Mello, Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel" Aggravating Circum-
stance: Narrowing the Class of Death-Eligible Cases Without Making It Smaller, 13 STESON L. REV.
523 (1984) (discussing complexities of Florida's statute); Pollman, Maynard v. Cartwright:
Channeling Arizona's Use of the Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Aggravating Circumstance to Impose the
Death Penalty, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 193 (1990) (examining Oklahoma's aggravating circumstance
provision); Note, Godfrey v. Georgia: Possible Effects on Virginia's Death Penalty Law, 15 U. RICH.
L. REv. 951 (1981) (applying Godfrey rationale to Virginia's capital sentencing statute). In
1980, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Georgia Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Georgia statute that permitted the imposition of capital punishment if the offense
was committed in an "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" manner. Godfrey
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 420 (1980) (plurality opinion). In that case, a plurality of the Court
found this interpretation of an aggravating circumstance vague because it provided no re-
straint on arbitrary or capricious sentencing. Id. at 428-29. The Court found that any person
of ordinary sensibility could characterize almost any homicide as "wantonly vile." Id.
Subsequent to Godfrey, the Court struck down an Oklahoma statutory definition of aggravat-
ing circumstance that permitted imposition of the death sentence if the crime was "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 356 (1988). The Court
rejected the Oklahoma definition because it provided no more guidance than the aggravating
circumstance criticized in Godfrey. Id. at 363-64. In Walton, Justice Blackmun argued that the
Arizona construction of "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" certainly provided no more
direction to a sentencer than the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" definition struck
down in Maynard. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
A majority of the Court in Walton, however, upheld the Arizona statutory definition for two
reasons. First, the Arizona statute delegated the sentencing to ajudge who was presumed to
need less guidance than juries. Id. at 3056-57. Second, the judge was presumed to have
followed the Arizona Supreme Court's limiting interpretation of the aggravating circumstance
definition as "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner," thereby curing any potential
constitutional defect. Id. at 3057. Justice Blackmun was not persuaded by this reasoning and
found that these factors did not support the Court's decision to affirm the petitioner's death
sentence. Id. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3086 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (concluding that "[tloday's deci-
1991] 1415
1416 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW[Vol. 40:1389
filed his own.15 8 He concluded that the Arizona statute's delegation
of post-conviction fact-finding to a judge rather than to a jury of-
fended the sixth amendment right to a jury trial. 159 Justice Stevens
also rebuked Justice Scalia's concurrence and dismissed it as noth-
ing more than "reactionary."' 160 Justice Stevens concluded with an
affirmation of the two-prong limitation on capital punishment.' 6'
sion is either an abdication of the Court's constitutional role, or it is a silent repudiation of
previously settled principles").
158. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3086-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 3086-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Arizona statute at issue in Walton dele-
gated not only the sentencing decision, but also the mitigating factor analysis, to the judge.
Id. at 3087 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens discussed this in relation to the sixth
amendment right to a trial by jury. Id. at 3088-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968) and application of sixth amendment
right to trial by jury to states). The Court had previously retreated from its resolute interpre-
tation of the sixth amendment when it permitted the imposition of capital sentencing by a
judge, rather than a jury. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 447 (1984) (upholding Flor-
ida statute delegating capital sentencing authority to judge). Justice Stevens, however, con-
cluded that the Walton majority reached beyond Spaziano by delegating the fact-finding role of
mitigating circumstance analysis to thejudge. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). The Arizona statute, unlike the Florida statute at issue in Spaziano, provided for no jury
recommendation or input concerning the validity of mitigating evidence. Compare AMuz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (providing that only court shall consider aggravating and mitigating
circumstances) with FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1972) (current version at FLO. STAT. § 921.141
(1989)) (providing for recommendation of sentence by jury prior to court review of such rec-
ommendation). See also Note, Eighth Amendment-Trial Court May Impose Death Sentence Despite
Jury's Recommendation of Life Imprisonment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGy 813 (1984) (discussing
Court's decision permitting capital sentencing by judge in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447
(1984)); Schultz, The Jury Redefined: A Review of Burger Court Decisions, 43 LAw & CoNTEMp.
PROBS. Autumn 1980, at 8, 8-15 (1980) (discussing importance of trial by jury as interpreted
by Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968)); White, Fact-
Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defendant's Right tojury Trial, 65 NoTRE DAME
L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing right of capital defendant to have post-conviction sentencing
hearing before jury).
160. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3089-92 (Stevens,J, dissenting) (criticizingJustice Scalia's cate-
gorical rejection of developed precedent and stare decisis).
Justice Stevens also noted that, in Zant, the Georgia Supreme Court analogized the two-
prong eighth amendment doctrine to a pyramid. Id. at 3090-92 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862 (1983)). The pyramid paradigm has three levels. The first level is statutorily defined
types of homicides which qualify for capital punishment. Id. The second level is specific
homicides which may qualify for the death penalty as defined by statutory aggravating factors.
Id. The third level represents those cases in which capital punishment shall be imposed after
an evaluation of all mitigating circumstances. Id. The Furman guided discretion requirement
dictates the level two requirement: states must define certain aggravating factors that must
exist in order for a particular defendant to qualify for a capital sentence. See Walton, 110 S. Ct.
at 3090 & n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)
(Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., concurring) (noting that Furman has been characterized as man-
dating guidance along with discretion)). The Woodson-Lockett individualized sentencing re-
quirement dictates the level three requirement: states must allow complete discretion for the
sentencer to find mitigating circumstances sufficient to decline death penalty imposition. See
id. at 3070-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (setting forth principles of Woodson and Lockett as
mandating consideration of any mitigating factors).
161. See Walton, I10 S. Ct. at 3092 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (insisting that 1976 cases
presented best framework for regulating capital punishment under eighth amendment).
Walton v. Arizona
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WALTON
A. Constitutionality of Assigning Preponderance Burden to Presentation of
Mitigating Factors
The Arizona death penalty statute at issue in Walton requires the
defendant to establish mitigating evidence by a preponderance of
the evidence. 62 As a result, if a defendant fails to fulfill the requi-
site burden, the sentencer is precluded from giving any weight to
mitigating evidence presented at the capital sentencing hearing.
63
By preventing sentencer consideration of mitigating evidence, the
Arizona statute, on its face, offends both the fundamental doctrine
that death is qualitatively different from all other punishments and
the requirement of individualized sentencing that developed from
that premise.
The Court in Woodson required that every constitutionally valid
death penalty statute allow the sentencer to consider mitigating as
well as aggravating circumstances.164 As the doctrine of individual-
ized sentencing evolved, the Court struck down statutes that limited
mitigating evidence consideration. 65 Walton reversed this evalua-
tion by upholding a statute that limits a capital sentencer's consider-
ation of mitigating factors.'
66
The Court failed to address directly how the Arizona statute could
be reconciled with the body of eighth amendment jurisprudence de-
veloped over the last fifteen years. 167 Justice White briefly cited
only three cases to justify this radical departure from established
precedent. 68 Although two of the three cases involved defendants
who were sentenced to death, none specifically addressed the issue
of capital sentencing nor did any provide sufficient grounds for the
Supreme Court's deviation from established eighth amendment
jurisprudence.
162. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (1989); see also State v. McMurtrey, 143 Ariz. 71,
73, 691 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1984) (imposing preponderance burden on mitigating evidence),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911 (1987).
163. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (1989).
164. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion).
165. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
166. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3058 (upholding Arizona statute).
167. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3071 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (criticizing plurality for ignoring
settled precedent). Justice White, recognizing the obvious tension between the Arizona stat-
ute and established law, stated that "[i]t is true that the Court has refused to countenance
state-imposed restrictions on what mitigating circumstances may be considered in deciding
whether to impose the death penalty .... " Id. at 3055. Nevertheless, he summarily con-
cluded that the Arizona statute did not exclude any particular type of mitigating evidence. Id.
168. See id. (employing affirmative defense precedent of Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228
(1987); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977), to uphold defendant's preponderance burden at post-conviction capital sentencing
hearing).
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Justice White ignored the "death is different" doctrine by equat-
ing a defendant's burden of proof when presenting an affirmative
defense at trial to a defendant's burden of proof when presenting
mitigating evidence in a capital sentencing hearing. 169 In Patterson v.
New York, the first of the three affirmative defense cases cited byJus-
tice White, the Court considered whether a New York statute vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment by assigning a murder defendant
the burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance as an affirma-
tive defense. 170 In Patterson, the Court rejected the constitutional
challenge, finding that the state was not even required to recognize
the defense and, as such, could require any level of proof it saw
fit. 17 ' The Court's conclusion in Patterson, however, bears little rele-
vance to the issue in Walton.' 72
The notion that death is fundamentally different mandates addi-
tional due process safeguards when formulating a valid capital pun-
ishment statute. 73 Patterson is inapplicable to capital sentencing
jurisprudence because it involved the admissibility of evidence at a
criminal trial, not a post-conviction capital sentencing hearing. 74
The former must conform only to the requirements of due process
while the latter must adhere to the more stringent dictates of eighth
amendment jurisprudence. 75 In a post-conviction capital sentenc-
ing hearing, the state is specifically required to permit the presenta-
tion and consideration of mitigating circumstances. 76 By applying
Patterson, the Court in Walton ignored the "death is different" doc-
trine and erroneously equated the due process guarantees of a con-
victed prisoner facing a sentence of death with those of a criminal
169. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055.
170. Id.
171. Patterson 432 U.S. at 207-09. The Court in Patterson noted specifically: "If the State
nevertheless chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punish-
ment, we think the State may assure itself that the fact has been established with reasonable
certainty." Id. at 209.
172. See Walton, I10 S. Ct. at 3071-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (disparaging plurality's
citation of "analogous" cases because it did not directly address established eighth amend-
ment precedent).
173. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (recognizing higher de-
gree of scrutiny required during capital sentencing hearing); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604-05 (1978) (finding imposition of death sentences by public decree so profoundly different
than incarceration that individualized evaluation is essential in capital sentencing hearings);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion) (concluding
"that death is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree").
174. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 200 (finding law requiring defendant to prove by preponder-
ance of evidence defense of extreme emotional disturbance did not violate due process).
175. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (stating that heightened procedural safeguards are required
in death penalty statutes).
176. See id. at 304 (requiring consideration of "mitigating factors stemming from the di-
verse frailties of humankind").
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defendant at trial. 177
In addition to Patterson, Justice White cited Leland v. Oregon as pre-
cedent to justify Arizona's preponderance burden provision.t 78 The
Court in Leland held that an Oregon statute requiring a murder de-
fendant to prove the defense of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt
did not violate the due process clause.' 79 The relevance of Leland is
also limited because it was decided twenty-six years before Lockett
and the development of the eighth amendment jurisprudence ad-
dressed in Walton.' 80 Although the defendant in Leland was sen-
tenced to death after being convicted of first degree murder, that
sentence had nothing to do with the issues presented to the
Supreme Court.' 8' Just as Patterson dealt with the defendant's pre-
ponderance burden in proving extreme emotional disturbance, Le-
land addressed whether the state could require a criminal defendant
to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 182 In fact, the issue
for which Leland was cited in Walton, whether a state may assign a
preponderance burden to mitigating evidence at a capital sentenc-
ing hearing, was never mentioned in Leland itself.18 3 Justice White's
use of Leland as controlling precedent to justify a retreat from the
177. See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055-56 (citing non-capital cases allocating burdens of proof
to defendants without distinguishing capital cases).
178. Id. at 3055 (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)). The Court presented
Leland as a case upholding the requirement that the defense of insanity be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt by the defendant in a capital sentencing case. Id.
179. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S 790, 799 (1952).
180. Id The Leland case was decided onJune 9, 1952. Id.
181. Id. at 792. The principal issue addressed in Leland was whether the Oregon statute,
requiring that a criminal defendant prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, deprived him
or her of life and liberty without due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Id.
In contrast, the issue on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Walton involved a
direct challenge to the mitigating circumstances calculation relevant to the sentencing proce-
dure under the Arizona statute. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3049-50.
182. See Leland, 343 U.S. at 792 (citing Oregon statute at ORE. COMP. LAws §§ 26-929, 23-
122 (1940) regarding burden of proof on insanity defense). The statute provided that "when
the commission of the act charged as a crime is proven, and the defense sought to be estab-
lished is the insanity of the defendant, the same must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
-.... ORE. COMP. LAWS § 26-929 (1940); see also Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 (holding that due
process is satisfied even when defendant must prove defense of emotional disturbance by
preponderance of evidence).
183. See Leland, 343 U.S. at 792 (stating that judge sentenced defendant to death without
additional sentencing hearing); Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055 (citing Leland as requiring defense
of insanity be proven beyond reasonable doubt). The Oregon jury convicted Leland of first
degree murder and refused to recommend life imprisonment. Leland, 343 U.S. at 792. Fol-
lowing the death penalty provisions then in force, the trial court sentenced Leland to death
without an additional sentencing hearing. Id. Despite the sentence of death imposed by the
trial judge, the issue in Leland involved only the statutory provision requiring a defendant to
prove the insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt after the state had proven all the ele-
ments of the offense. Id. at 792. Because the case was decided in 1952, there was no bifur-
cated sentencing hearing as required in recent capital cases. In fact, the eighth amendment
issues relevant to the Walton decision did not evolve until Furman v. Georgia was decided in
1972, some 20 years after Leland was decided.
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Lockett requirement of individualized sentencing and the underlying
"death is different" doctrine is, therefore, untenable.
Finally, the Court cited Martin v. Ohio as its third example of pre-
cedent upholding a statute placing a preponderance burden on a
capital defendant.18 4 As in Patterson and Leland, the Court in Martin
was faced with an issue involving the burden of proof imposed on an
affirmative defense to a charge of murder.18 5 The defendant in Mar-
tin was convicted of aggravated murder after killing her husband
during a domestic argument.1 86 The appeal on which certiorari was
granted concerned the defendant's burden of persuasion in proving
self-defense. 87 Instead of the insanity defense at issue in Leland,
Martin addressed the issue of whether a state could require proof of
self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.' 8 8 Following its
affirmative defense ruling in Patterson, the Court in Martin concluded
that the preponderance burden was appropriate for a criminal de-
fendant asserting a claim of self-defense at trial.'8 9 There was, how-
ever, no mention of eighth amendment jurisprudence and,
therefore, Martin also fails to provide any justification for the
Supreme Court's analysis in Walton.
The Court's opinion in Walton provided only a cursory rationale
for its position. In a scant two-page analysis, Justice White
presented three inapplicable cases to uphold the Arizona provision
requiring a capital defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a
preponderance of the evidence.' 90 All three cases dealt exclusively
with affirmative defense issues outside the eighth amendment doc-
trines at issue in Walton.' 9' In effect, because prior cases permitted
the assignment of heightened burdens of proof for affirmative de-
fenses, the Court in Walton reasoned that a state may impose the
same burden on a defendant presenting mitigating evidence in op-
position to a capital sentence. 9 2 This conclusion clearly offends the
doctrines set forth in Woodson and Lockett and runs counter to the
184. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055 (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987)). In Walton,
the Court described its decision in Martin v. Ohio as upholding the statutory imposition of a
preponderance burden on evidence that the capital defendant was acting in self-defense. Id.
185. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1987); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 200; Leland,
343 U.S. at 792.
186. Martin, 480 U.S. at 231.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 231.
189. Id. at 231-33 (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02 for proposition that state may set its
own requirement for affirmative defense burden of proof.
190. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055-56.
191. Id. at 3051.




fundamental precept that the punishment of death is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprisonment.
The "death is different" doctrine, reinforced by the individualized
sentencing requirements of Woodson and Lockett, cannot be recon-
ciled with the Arizona statutory construction at issue in Walton. Cit-
ing the unique status of the death penalty, Woodson validated only
those statutes which permit the sentencer to evaluate the capital de-
fendant's particularized circumstances. 193 The Arizona statute's ex-
clusion of all mitigating circumstances not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence offends both the broad decree set
forth in Woodson and the more particular requirements mandated by
subsequent cases.
Lockett and its progeny addressed the very concerns raised by the
Arizona preponderance provision and held that a statute may not
preclude consideration of "any aspect of a defendant's character or
record or any circumstances of the offense that the defendant prof-
fers as a basis for a sentence less than death."' 94 The Arizona stat-
ute clearly precludes mitigating circumstances not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.195 The Supreme Court has, in the
past, consistently upheld Lockett.196 In Walton, however, the Court
refused to apply the doctrine or provide any convincing justification
for doing so.
B. The Arizona Statute's Presumption of Death Provision
Justice White's opinion also provided scant justification for up-
holding the Arizona statute's presumption of death provision. 197 By
mandating a sentence of death unless the defendant's mitigating ev-
idence outweighed the aggravating circumstances presented by the
state, the Arizona statute created a presumption in favor of impos-
ing death.' 98 To justify the Arizona statutory construction, the
193. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (permitting capital sentence only after particularized
consideration of relevant aspects of character and record of convicted defendant).
194. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. A majority of the Supreme Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma
further clarified the mitigating circumstances evaluation requirement by declaring that the
sentencer may determine the relevance of a particular factor but "may not give it no weight by
excluding such evidence from their consideration." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-
15 (1982).
195. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (describing preponderance burden set
forth in Arizona capital sentencing statute).
196. See generally Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 399 (1987) (citing Lockett, Eddings,
and Skipper as governing precedent in unanimous decision).
197. See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3075-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contesting plurality's
analysis in upholding Arizona's presumption of death provision in cases where aggravating
and mitigating circumstances are evenly balanced).
198. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text (discussing Arizona capital punish-
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Court cited only two capital cases, Blystone v. Pennsylvania '9 9 and
Boyde v. California.
200
Both cases, however, fail to provide a sufficient basis to justify the
Court's holding in Walton. Neither the statute at issue in Blystone nor
the jury instruction at issue in Boyde dictated a death sentence if the
defendant presented mitigating evidence equal to the aggravating
factors established by the state.20 Both cases involved statutes with
provisions requiring the imposition of a capital sentence only if the
state's aggravating factors clearly outweigh the defendant's mitigat-
ing circumstances. 20 2 The Court in Walton, therefore, failed to sup-
port its decision to uphold the presumption of death provision.
The Arizona statute mandated a sentence of death if the defend-
ant's mitigating factors did not outweigh the state's aggravating cir-
cumstances. 203 The Blystone/Boyde construction, on the other hand,
required a death sentence if the state's aggravating factors out-
weighed the defendant's mitigating circumstances. 20 4 The provi-
sions at issue in Boyde and Blystone would not require the imposition
of a death sentence in a case where the mitigating factors are of
equal weight to the aggravating factors. 205 If, however, a sentencer
found the defendant's mitigating evidence and the state's aggravat-
ment statute's presumption of death provision and Arizona Supreme Court's consistent
interpretation).
199. 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990).
200. 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990).
201. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Boyde v. California, the jury
was instructed that "[i]f you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the miti-
gating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death." Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct.
1190, 1195 (1990) (emphasis added) (citing from California jury instruction form, CALJIC
8.84.2, given to Boydejury). The California Supreme Court had previously ruled, however,
that the mandatory language in the California jury instruction did not provide for a mechani-
cal weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. See People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 545,
n.19, 726 P.2d 516, 535, n.19, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 853, n.19 (1986) (upholding constitutional-
ity ofjury introduction cautioningjury not to be swayed by passion or prejudice), reo'don other
grounds, 479 U.S. 538 (1987). For ajury to return a death sentence, it must be persuaded that
the aggravating evidence is so substantial, compared with the mitigating circumstances, that it
warrants a death sentence and not life imprisonment. Id.
The Blystone Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute which provided: "[t]he verdict must be a
sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance.., and
no mitigating circumstance." Blystone, 110 S. Ct. 1078, 1085 (1990) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing PA. CoNs. STAT. § 971 1(c)(1)(iv) (1988)).
202. See Blystone, 110 S. Ct. at 1085-86; Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1194-96.
203. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text (discussing Arizona's presumption of
death provision).
204. Blystone, 110 S. Ct. at 1085-86; Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1194-96. In the Blystone/Boyde
model, if the aggravating and mitigating factors are equal, a death sentence would not be
mandated. Id. Under the Walton scheme, however, a capital sentence is required if the miti-
gating circumstances, although equal, do not outweigh the aggravating factors. See Walton,
110 S. Ct. at 3056.
205. See Blystone, 110 S. Ct. at 1079 (holding that death only imposed when aggravating
factors outweigh mitigating circumstances); Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1195 (interpreting statute as
requiring death sentence when aggravating factors greater than mitigating circumstances).
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ing factors to be of equal weight, the statute at issue in Walton would
mandate a death sentence.20 6 Therefore, the Arizona statute cannot
be reconciled with those of California and Pennsylvania.
The qualitative difference between death and all other penalties
provides the foundation for the presumption of death provision's
invalidity. In Gregg, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's death
penalty statute principally because of the heightened due process
protection afforded the capital defendant.20 7 By mandating a capital
sentence unless sufficient mitigating evidence is presented, the Ari-
zona statute, in effect, requires the defendant to convince a judge
that death is not an appropriate punishment. At the guilt phase, a
defendant is considered innocent until proven guilty and the burden
of persuasion rests with the state.20 8 The Arizona presumption of
death provision, however, shifts the burden of persuasion from the
state to the individual capital defendant.
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia asserted that the Furman precedent cannot coexist
with the individualized sentencing requirements of Woodson and
Lockett.209 Because Furman mandated less capital sentencing discre-
tion, Justice Scalia concluded that the Woodson decision which re-
quired more discretion could not be reconciled within the same body
of law. 210 Justice Scalia failed, however, to consider the fundamen-
tal precept of eighth amendment jurisprudence: death is different.
Justice Scalia endorsed Furman and its ban on unfettered discre-
206. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 1988) (mandating sentence of death if
aggravating factor proven and no mitigating evidence is established sufficiently substantial to
call for leniency); see also supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing relevant statu-
tory language).
207. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing
importance of heightened due process required of valid capital sentencing statute); see also id.
at 222-23 (White, J., concurring) (concluding that Georgia statute at issue provided sufficient
safeguards to guide juries in capital sentencing without risk of arbitrary or capricious results).
208. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (enunciating importance of
precept that criminal defendant is innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt).
The Supreme Court has consistently endorsed a presumption of innocence, and its enforce-
ment is the foundation of the American criminal justice system. Id.
209. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3058-61 (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to individualized sen-
tencing requirements set forth in Woodson as "counterdoctrine" to Furman guided discretion
requirement). Interestingly, only three years before writing his scathing attack on developed
eighth amendment jurisprudence in Walton, Justice Scalia upheld those same doctrines. In
Hitchcock v. Dugger, Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, vacated a capital
sentence because the trial judge instructed the sentencing jury to consider only a finite list of
mitigating circumstances. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398 (1987). Justice Scalia
found that the judge's action violated the doctrines set forth in Lockett, Eddings, and Skipper
proscribing judicial preclusion of non-statutory mitigating factors from sentencing considera-
tion. Id. at 398-99.
210. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3059.
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tion but dismissed the Woodson/Lockett requirement of individualized
sentencing. 211 If the two doctrines are considered within the con-
text of the "death is different" doctrine, however, it becomes clear
that they can and must coexist to ensure proper safeguards against
faulty sentencing. The two doctrines work in concert to protect
against any imposition of an erroneous death sentence and the irre-
versible result that would follow. 2 12
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF WALTON
The Court's deviation from established eighth amendment juris-
prudence in Walton will have a long-standing effect on the future
application of the death penalty and on future legislative enactments
designed to expedite the capital sentencing process. By upholding
the constitutionality of a preponderance burden on mitigating evi-
dence introduced by a capital defendant, Walton begins to erode the
heightened due process mandated by the eighth amendment. 215
Now that the Court has judicially endorsed the Arizona statute,
other states are free to employ the same statutory construction to
diminish the guarantees ensured by the "death is different"
doctrine.
Seven months after Walton, a new Supreme Court decided Parker
v. Dugger.214 In Parker, a Florida trial court judge overruled a jury
recommendation for life imprisonment and imposed a sentence of
death. 215 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the sentence, ac-
cepting without further inquiry the trial court's finding that no miti-
gating circumstances existed sufficient to outweigh the aggravating
factors. 2 16 A sharply divided United States Supreme Court reversed
the sentence and remanded for resentencing in light of mitigating
evidence presented by the record.217
211. Id. at 3068 (Scalia,J.,'concurring).
212. See generally supra note 160 (summarizing Georgia Supreme Court's discussion of two-
prong eighth amendment jurisprudence developed from Furman and Woodson).
213. See supra notes 105-26 and accompanying text (discussing Court's treatment of pre-
ponderance burden provision).
214. 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991). Justice Souter joined the Court following the resignation of
Justice Brennan.
215. Parker v. Dugger, I IIS. Ct. 731, 732 (1991).
216. Id. at 732-33.
217. Id. at 740. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souterjoined. Justice White wrote a strong dissent in which Justice
Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 733, 740.
After the defendant had exhausted his state court remedies, the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida granted the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
as to the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 734-35. The District Court found that the
mitigating circumstances prevalent in the record made the capital sentence unconstitutional.
Id. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, upholding the judge's weighing
of aggravating and mitigating evidence and finding no constitutional error in the capital sen-
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A Florida jury had convicted Robert Parker of two counts of first
degree murder and one count of third degree murder.21 8 Under
Florida law, a capital defendant is sentenced by the trial judge after
an advisory sentencing hearing is conducted and the jury makes its
recommendation. 21 9 In Parker, the jury concluded that sufficient
mitigating circumstances existed to outweigh the state's aggravating
factors and recommended two sentences of life imprisonment.2
20
The mitigating evidence included the large amounts of alcohol and
drugs the defendant had ingested immediately prior to the inci-
dent,221 the non-capital sentences extended to two of his accom-
plices, 222 the defendant's difficult childhood, 223 and the positive
relationships exhibited between the defendant and his children and
neighbors. 224 The trial judge, however, after considering all of the
evidence, overrode the jury's recommendation on one of the three
counts and sentenced Robert Parker to death.22 5 The Florida
Supreme Court summarily approved the trial judge's mitigating fac-
tor analysis.
226
Under Florida law, a capital sentencer must consider all mitigat-
ing evidence in which the sentencer is "reasonably convinced" of its
validity. 227 This standard allows consideration of a much broader
range of evidence than the more restrictive preponderance burden
employed by the Arizona statute at issue in Walton. 228 As such, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge's find-
tence. Id. at 735. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at
732-33.
218. Parker, 111 S. Ct. at 734. Parker took part in the crimes with three others while
attempting to recover money owed for a narcotics transaction. Id. at 733-34.
219. Fla. Stat. §§ 921.141(2), 921.141(3) (West 1990).
220. Parker, 111 S. Ct. at 734.
221. Id. at 736.
222. Id. Two co-conspirators entered guilty pleas to second degree murder. Id. at 736.
The third was convicted on three counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to death on
two of those counts. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 735-36.
226. Id. at 734. The Florida Supreme Court did find two aggravating factors invalid, but
apparently did not apply the same scrutiny to the analysis of mitigating factors. Id. The only
mention of that analysis consisted of the following statement:
The trial court found no mitigating circumstances to balance against the aggravating
factors, of which four were properly applied. In light of these findings the facts sug-
gesting the sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable
person could differ. The jury override was proper and the facts of this case clearly
place it within the class of homicides for which the death penalty has been found
appropriate.
Id. (citations omitted).
227. Id. at 736 (citing Florida Bar, Florida StandardJury Instructions in Criminal Cases 81
(1981) that was employed by the trial judge to instruct the advisory jury).
228. See supra notes 105-26 and accompanying text (discussing preponderance burden
provision of Arizona's capital sentencing statute).
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ing that no mitigating circumstances existed sufficient to outweigh
the aggravating circumstances was clearly erroneous considering
the record, the jury's recommendation, and the trial judge's accept-
ance of a jury-recommended life sentence for the other first degree
murder conviction.2 29
The Parker decision somewhat clarifies the viability of the "death
is different" doctrine after Walton. Despite clear applicability, the
Court did not cite Lockett or Woodson as precedent to invalidate the
mitigating circumstance evaluation as constitutionally deficient. In-
stead, the Court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court failed to
provide an adequate review of the record by failing to examine the
weight assigned by the trial judge to the mitigating evidence.23 0
Had the trial court concluded that no mitigating circumstances ex-
isted at all, however, the reviewing court would be justified in adopt-
ing such a finding without constitutional implications.23 '
If the same facts had occurred under Arizona's statutory scheme,
the trial judge could have imposed a death sentence after finding no
mitigating circumstances sufficient to satisfy the preponderance bur-
den of proof2 32 A summary affirmation by the reviewing court in
such a case would present no question of error because there would
be no weighing analysis to review. The fundamental doctrine re-
quiring a higher standard of review in capital sentencing can now be
wholly subverted, therefore, by the legislative adoption of a prepon-
derance burden for mitigating evidence admission.
In the aftermath of Woodson and Lockett, states modified their
death penalty statutes to allow sentencers to consider all mitigating
evidence presented by a capital defendant. The current Alabama
statute represents the typical post-Lockett treatment of mitigation cir-
cumstance consideration in that a capital defendant has only the
burden of presenting mitigating factors.233 After the evidence has
229. Id. at 736-38. Under Florida law, a judge may override a jury recommendation and
impose a death sentence only if the facts suggesting such a sentence are so clear and convinc-
ing that virtually no reasonable person could contest it. Id. at 735 (citing Tedder v. State, 322
So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) (per curiam). The Supreme Court concluded that this standard
was not met. Id. at 740 (concluding that Florida Supreme Court's affirmance of death penalty
based upon trial judge's analysis was arbitrary).
230. Id. at 738. The Court majority chastised the Florida Supreme Court for rubber-
stamping the trial court's finding that no mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating fac-
tors. Id. at 738-39. Justice O'Connor noted that the error resulted because the weighing of
mitigating and aggravating factors was suspect and that the state Supreme Court failed to
conduct an adequate review. Id.
231. See id. at 740 (postulating that "if the trial judge had found no mitigating circum-
stances and the Florida Supreme Court had relied on that finding, our review would be very
different.").
232. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (Supp. 1988).
233. ALA. CODE § 13A-4-52 (1990).
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been introduced to the post-conviction sentencing hearing, the state
must disprove the validity of the mitigating factor by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
23 4
In a few jurisdictions, however, the burden on capital defendants
to prove mitigating evidence has been expanded. The preponder-
ance burden assigned by the Arizona statute and upheld in Walton
has been expressly adopted by the legislatures of Maryland and Wy-
oming. 235 Other states, although not adopting the preponderance
burden explicitly through law, have burdened the capital defendant
through judicial interpretation of ambiguous statutory language.
23 6
The legislatures of Florida and New Hampshire as well as the
United States Congress are currently considering bills that modify
their respective capital sentencing statutes to include a preponder-
ance burden provision. 23 7 Considering the uniformity in statutory
234. Id. The Alabama statute provides:
When the factual existence of an offered mitigating circumstance is in dispute, the
defendant shall have the burden of interjecting the issue, but once it is interjected
the state shall have the burden of disproving the factual existence of that circum-
stance by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id.
235. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1989); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102 (1989); The Maryland
statute provides that if a jury finds the existence of any aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt, then it shall "consider whether, based upon a preponderance of the evi-
dence," any mitigating circumstances exist. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g) (1989). The
Wyoming statute simply requires the jury consider only those mitigating circumstances
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-2-102(e)(ii) to (iii) (1989).
236. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 207 Conn. 374, 384-85, 542 A.2d 306 (1988) (interpreting
Connecticut statutory language requiring "existence of mitigating circumstances" as endors-
ing a preponderance burden); State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St. 3d 95 (1987) (justifying prepon-
derance burden by citing comment to prior Ohio statute despite fact that prior statute had
been found unconstitutional in Lockett); State v.Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979)
(assigning North Carolina capital defendant burden of proving mitigating circumstances by
preponderance of evidence despite lack of explicit statutory requirement).
237. See 1990 Fla. Laws 1242 (proposing requirement that evidence of retardation be
proven by preponderance of evidence when presented as a mitigating factor in a Florida post-
conviction capital sentencing hearing); 1990 N.H. Laws 1157-FN (proposing revision of entire
New Hampshire capital sentencing statute and incorporation of preponderance burden on
any mitigating evidence presented by capital defendant).
Congress has yet to pass a death penalty statute in Which the defendant is required to prove
mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. At this time, however, 23 bills
are pending in the 102nd Congress involving various death penalty statutes and amendments.
Each of these 23 bills contains a provision mandating a preponderance burden for mitigating
circumstance evaluation. See H.R. 365, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3592(c) (1991) (proposing
bill to combat violent crime); H.R. 596, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(d) (1991) (initiating death
penalty for certain crimes in District of Columbia); H.R. 628, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3593
(1991) (providing for new capital punishment procedures); H.R. 639, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3592(c) (1991) (suggesting death penalty provisions to deal with terrorist murders); H.R.
731, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. § 2338(c)(3) (1991) (employing capital punishment procedures to
punish domestic and international terrorist acts); H.R. 769, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 1102(3)
(1991) (proposing Comprehensive Counter-terrorism Act of 1991); H.R. 822, 102nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 3795(d) (1991) (seeking to amend title 18, United States Code, to strengthen death
penalty procedures); H.R. 826, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2332(f)(3)(C) (1991) (providing con-
stitutional procedures for imposition of death penalty in response to terrorist murders); H.R.
857, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3592(c) (1991) (submitting plan to overhaul federal death pen-
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language employed to impose a preponderance burden on mitigat-
ing evidence, the flood of federal capital sentencing legislation rep-
resents the first immediate reaction to the Supreme Court's decision
in Walton. More state legislatures are likely to follow suit in an effort
to expedite the capital sentencing process.
CONCLUSION
Since its invalidation of all death penalty statutes in Furman, the
Supreme Court has struggled to develop a viable doctrine reflecting
the eighth amendment's limitation on capital punishment. Despite
numerous challenges over the ensuing years, the two-prong analysis
requiring both individualized sentencing and non-arbitrary deci-
sion-making has endured. The glue holding this fragile construc-
tion together has been the fundamental notion that a sentence of
death is unlike any other punishment and, therefore, requires a
heightened version of due process. By rejecting the need for
heightened due process in the mitigating circumstance evaluation,
the Supreme Court's decision in Walton severely weakens this under-
lying bond.
Rather than mandating the consideration of all mitigating factors
and placing the burden on the state to counter such evidence, the
Court has shifted the burden of proof to the capital defendant. In-
stead of forcing the state to convince ajury why an individual should
be executed, the burden now falls on the individual to show why he
or she should not be executed.
In combination with the Court's subsequent decision in Parker,
Walton represents a radical shift from prior eighth amendmentjuris-
alty provisions); H.R. 864, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3594(a) (1991) (suggesting alternative
plan for new constitutional federal death penalty statute); H.R. 1149, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1118(h) (1991) (furnishing death penalty provision in bill designed to secure right of wo-
men to be free of sexual violence); H.R. 1400, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. § 3592(c) (1991) (seek-
ing to curb abuse of habeas corpus and reduce number of death penalty appeals); H.R. 1421,
102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3592(c) (1991) (advancing penalty of death for certain killings of
federal law enforcement officers); S. 18, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3592(c) (1991) (suggesting
new procedures for imposition of federal death penalty); S. 105, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 3592(c) (1991) (proposing new Drug Kingpin Death Penalty Act); S. 147, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess., § 3592(c) (1991) (seeking to replace federal death penalty procedures with Federal
Death Penalty Act of 1991); S. 245, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess., § 2332(0(3)(C) (1991) (sug-
gesting procedures for imposition of death penalty for terrorist murders); S. 265, 102nd
Cong., Ist Sess., § 2332(f)(3)(C) (1991) (seeking to expand death penalty crimes to include
terrorist murder and others); S. 266, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 2338(c)(3) (1991) (proposing
comprehensive package to counter terrorism); S. 320, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 2332(0 (3)(C)
(1991) (amending Terrorist Death Penalty Act of 1991); S. 472, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 1118(i) (1991) (providing companion bill in Senate to H.R. 1149 protecting women from
sexual violence); S. 618, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 3592(c) (1991) (suggesting general proce-
dures to reduce violent crime); S. 635, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 3592(c) (1991) (seeking to
curb abuse of federal habeas corpus and to reduce number of capital appeals).
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prudence. As more jurisdictions abandon the Lockett doctrine re-
quiring consideration of all mitigating evidence in favor of the post-
Walton modification in which such evidence is not considered unless
it meets the preponderance burden, the amount of sentencer discre-
tion will grow. The heightened due process carefully woven into the
sentencing procedures over the last fifteen years will quickly unravel
when the existence of mitigating evidence is no longer reviewed by a
higher court. The penalty of death, therefore, will become simply
another decision subject to the fact-finder's discretion.

